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I. INTRODUCTION
When a person suspected of a crime is arrested without a warrant, the
Fourth Amendment guarantees that freedom may not be taken away
except upon a neutral magistrate judge’s prompt confirmation that
probable cause exists that this person in fact committed the crime. In
contrast, in the deportation process, a person is often detained for weeks
before a judge determines that the noncitizen is actually deportable, thus
justifying detention. Even the separate procedures available to review
custody do not suffice because the mandatory detention statute renders
many detainees ineligible for review by a judge. If they are entitled to a
bond hearing, the presumption is detention, and the detainee must bear
the burden of proving he is not a danger or a flight risk.
In this Article, I make a modest proposal: for post-entry social control
acts of deportation, immigration detainees must be brought promptly
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research assistance.
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before a neutral judge to determine whether probable cause exists to hold
them. I limit the reach of this proposal to the post-entry social control acts
of deportation (as opposed to extended border control cases) because
those are the deportation cases that most resemble punishment for a
crime. Also, for strategic reasons, those who have been admitted to the
United States are better served by a quick probable cause hearing before
an immigration judge, whereas entrants without inspection could benefit
from more time to consult with a lawyer before any such hearing. I also
foresee that this proposal will lead the government to more carefully
justify its decision to detain lawful permanent residents (LPRs), and thus
LPRs, who have the strongest claims to procedural protections, will
benefit the most from this additional procedure.
This Article contributes to the growing literature about the need to
import criminal justice rights into the deportation system. Stephen
Legomsky noted, as a general matter, that there are asymmetries between
these systems—that immigration removal proceedings have incorporated
many of the punishment-like features of a criminal trial, without
importing the procedural protections of the criminal trial. 1 Other
scholarship has advocated for the application of other rights guaranteed
in a criminal trial—court-appointed counsel, freedom from ex post facto
laws, freedom from double jeopardy, proportionality principles, the
confrontation clause, and the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule—in
removal proceedings.2 Christopher Lasch has focused on the Fourth
1
See Stephen H. Legomsky, The New Path of Immigration Law: Asymmetric Incorporation of
Criminal Justice Norms, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 469, 472 (2007) (declaring that enforcement
features of the criminal justice model have been enforced in immigration law while
adjudication features have been rejected). “A pattern has emerged: those features of the
criminal justice model that can roughly be classified as enforcement have indeed been
imported. Those that relate to adjudication, in particular, the bundle of procedural rights
recognized in criminal cases, which have been consciously rejected.” Id.
2
See Mary Holper, Confronting Cops in Immigration Court, 23 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 675,
675 (2015). See also Michael J. Wishnie, Immigration Law and the Proportionality Requirement, 2
U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 415, 417–18 (2012) (asserting that removal is sufficiently punitive to
trigger constitutional proportionality review pursuant to the Fifth Amendment Due Process
Clause and the Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause); Jennifer
Chacón, A Diversion of Attention? Immigration Courts and the Adjudication of Fourth and Fifth
Amendment Rights, 59 DUKE L.J. 1563, 1624–27 (2010) (proposing the application of the Fourth
Amendment exclusionary rule in removal proceedings); Stella Burch Elias, “Good Reason to
Believe”: Widespread Constitutional Violations in the Course of Immigration Enforcement and the
Case for Revisiting Lopez-Mendoza, 2008 WIS. L. REV. 1109, 1115 (2008) (urging for an
application of the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule due to widespread constitutional
violations by immigration officers and a fundamental change in immigration court practice
since Lopez-Mendoza was decided); Robert Pauw, A New Look at Deportation as Punishment:
Why at Least Some of the Constitution’s Criminal Procedure Protections Must Apply, 52 ADMIN. L.
REV. 305, 339–40 (2000) (proposing the Eight Amendment’s requirement that the punishment
be proportional to the offense, the ex post facto clause, and the Sixth Amendment’s right to
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Amendment violations inherent in Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (ICE) detainer practices.3 Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia has
commented on the lack of prompt review of detention as part of a larger
set of recommendations to ICE to “inject humanity into its arrest,
detention, and removal procedures . . . .”4 César Cuauhtémoc García
Hernández has critiqued the immigration process in which the
government can “merely lodge an accusation that a person has violated
the law.”5
Michael Kagan, in a recent Article, critiqued the practice of
warrantless arrests without a prompt probable cause hearing by a neutral
decisionmaker for immigration detainees. 6 He writes:
Until now, the means by which federal authorities take
immigrants into custody have been insulated from
constitutional scrutiny by the plenary power doctrine and
by the premise that immigration law is civil, not criminal.
These doctrines allowed the American immigration
enforcement infrastructure to develop in a parallel
universe for more than a century.
But rapid
developments in case law in the twenty-first century have
significantly stripped away this insulation.7

counsel should apply in deportation proceedings); Javier Bleichmar, Deportation as
Punishment: A Historical Analysis of the British Practice of Banishment and Its Impact on Modern
Constitutional Law, 14 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 115, 119, 160–63 (1999) (presenting that the current
deportation laws violate the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment); Nancy
Morawetz, Rethinking Retroactive Deportation Laws and the Due Process Clause, 73 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 97, 97 (1998) (advocating for the principles against retroactivity embodied in the ex post
facto clause to apply to deportation proceedings); Stephen H. Legomsky, Deportation of an
Alien for a Marijuana Conviction Can Constitute Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 13 SAN DIEGO
L. REV. 454, 467 (1976) (finding that Eighth Amendment cruel and unusual punishment
analysis should apply to deportation for marijuana convictions).
3
See, e.g., Christopher N. Lasch, Legal Problems With Detainers, LITIGATING IMMIGRATION
DETAINER ISSUES, Ch. 34 (1st ed. 2011) (focusing on Fourth Amendment rights in ICE detainer
practices). See also Christopher Lasch, Enforcing the Limits of the Executive’s Authority to Issue
Immigration Detainers, 35 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 164, 165–66 (2008) (asserting current
regulations regarding detainers overstep limited authority granted by Congress).
4
Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, Under Arrest: Immigrants’ Rights and the Rule of Law, 38 U.
MEM. L. REV. 853, 888 (2008).
5
César Cuauhtémoc García Hernández, Invisible Spaces and Invisible Lives in Immigration
Detention, 57 HOW. L.J. 869, 882 (2014).
6
See Michael Kagan, Immigration Law’s Looming Fourth Amendment Problem, 104 GEO. L.J.
125, 166–67 (2015) (questioning warrantless arrests in which detainees are not granted a
prompt probable cause hearing by a neutral decisionmaker).
7
Id. at 167.
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Kagan recommends that courts engage in statutory interpretation of the
statute authorizing detention to correct this problem, 8 and proposes the
following: (1) immigration judges should start holding probable cause
hearings; (2) the Immigration and Nationality Act should be amended to
state that the standard for arrests should be probable cause; and (3) if a
person is held in immigration custody for more than seventy-two hours,
an immigration judge must review his case to ensure the existence of
probable cause.9
In the present Article, I take Kagan’s identification of an important
Fourth Amendment violation that is regularly occurring within
immigration law and I make the proposal that only in post-entry social
control types of deportation should such hearings occur. 10 By “post-entry
social control” acts of deportation, named by Daniel Kanstroom, 11 I refer
to the deportation of noncitizens who have been admitted to the United

8
See id. (endorsing a focus on the existing provisions of the INA providing that an alien
may be detained while it is decided whether or not they can remain in the United States).
Specifically, he proposes that courts interpret 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), which provides: “on a
warrant issued by the Attorney General, an alien may be arrested and detained pending a
decision on whether the alien is to be removed from the United States,” to include a probable
cause hearing before a neutral immigration judge. Id. at 167–68 (internal quotations omitted).
9
See id. at 168 (remarking that immigration judges should distribute immigrant arrest
warrants, the INA should be amended to clarify the probable cause standard for immigration
arrests, and an immigration judge must review every case in which a person is in
immigration custody for seventy-two hours after their arrest to ensure there is probable
cause). Kagan borrows the seventy-two hour requirement from state statutes that allow
involuntary commitment, which is civil, without a neutral review for up to seventy-two
hours. Id. at 165–66. He discusses a survey which revealed that only eight outlier states may
allow involuntary commitment without a neutral review for up to seven days. Id. at 165.
The norm in state statues is for involuntary commitment to not surpass seventy-two hours
without a neutral judge reviewing detention. Id. at 166. He notes that this right is guaranteed
by statute rather than by judicial mandate. Id. See also Project Release v. Provost, 722 F.2d
960, 975 (2d Cir. 1983) (declining to extend Gerstein to civil commitment statutes and finding
no due process violation when the state statute provides for a judicial hearing within five
days of demand by patient, relative, or friend, as well as habeas corpus relief).
10
See Kagan, supra note 6, at 166–67 (criticizing warrantless arrest without a prompt
probable cause hearing). See also infra Part V (proposing that probable cause hearings only
take place in post-entry social control types of deportation).
11
DANIEL KANSTROOM, DEPORTATION NATION: OUTSIDERS IN AMERICAN HISTORY 5 (2007)
[hereinafter KANSTROOM, DEPORTATION NATION]. See also Daniel Kanstroom, Deportation,
Social Control, and Punishment: Some Thoughts About Why Hard Laws Make Bad Cases, 113
HARV. L. REV. 1890, 1911 (2000) [hereinafter Kanstroom, Deportation, Social Control]
(presenting post-entry social control as a theory of deportation).
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States but who are deportable for criminal 12 or political conduct13—
conduct that arose after they entered the United States.14 More
specifically, any non-citizen whom the government charges under the
criminal or political grounds of deportability should get a probable cause
hearing within seventy-two hours of arrest by the immigration
authorities.15
The United States deportation system has never seen such a need for
review by the judiciary of ICE’s detention decisions, particularly in the
context of criminal deportations.16 Within his first week in office,
President Trump issued two Executive Orders calling for stricter
immigration enforcement and a stronger border.17 The Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) Memos implementing his interior and border
enforcement Executive Orders indicate that DHS will use every tool to
enforce the immigration law, including increased detention. 18 According
12
See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2) (2012) (imposing deportation for crimes involving moral
turpitude; aggravated felonies; crimes involving high-speed flight; failure to register as a sex
offender; controlled substance offenses; drug abuse; espionage and treason crimes; crimes of
domestic violence, stalking, or child abuse; violations of restraining order; and human
trafficking); 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(4) (2012) (ordering deportation for espionage, sabotage, or
criminal activity which endangers the public safety or national security).
13
See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(4) (2012) (requiring deportation for noncitizen who engages
in “any activity a purpose of which is the opposition to, or the control or overthrow of, the
Government of the United States by force, violence, or other unlawful means”); 8
U.S.C. § 1227(a)(4)(C) (proscribing deportation for an “alien whose presence or activities in
the United States the Secretary of State has reasonable ground to believe would have
potentially serious adverse foreign policy consequences for the United States”).
14
See Daniel Kanstroom, The Right to Deportation Counsel in Padilla v. Kentucky: The
Challenging Construction of the Fifth-and-a-Half Amendment, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1461, 1465 (2011)
(defining post-entry social control).
15
See infra Part V (urging that a noncitizen who faces deportation should be granted a
probable cause hearing within seventy-two hours).
16
See Donald S. Dobkin, Court Stripping and Limitations on Judicial Review of Immigration
Cases, 28 JUD. SYS. J. 104, 107 (2007) (identifying Constitutional issues arising from Congress
denying jurisdiction of the courts).
17
See Enhancing Public Safety in the Interior of the United States, 82 Fed. Reg. 8799, 8799
(Jan. 25, 2017) [hereinafter Enhancing Public Safety] (ordering that agencies employ all
lawful means to enforce the immigration laws of the United States); Border Security and
Immigration Enforcement Improvements, 82 Fed. Reg. 8793, 8793 (Jan. 25, 2017) (requiring
that agencies employ all lawful means to protect the United States’s border with Mexico and
prevent further illegal immigration into the United States).
18
See John Kelly, IMPLEMENTING PRESIDENT’S BORDER SECURITY AND IMMIGRATION
ENFORCEMENT IMPROVEMENTS POLICIES 2 (Feb. 20, 2017), https://www.dhs.gov/
publication/implementing-presidents-border-security-and-immigration-enforcementimprovement-policies [https://perma.cc/JU27-K2ZP] [hereinafter Border Security
Implementation Memo] (expressing that detention of undocumented aliens is the most efficient
way to enforce immigration law and prevent crime). See also John Kelly, ENFORCEMENT OF
IMMIGRATION LAWS TO SERVE THE NATIONAL INTEREST 3 (Feb. 20, 2017),
https://www.dhs.gov/publication/enforcement-immigration-laws-serve-national-interest
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to a June 2017 New Yorker article, “federal immigration authorities have
made forty per cent more arrests than they did at the equivalent point in
2016 . . . .” 19 From the beginning, President Trump has vowed to focus on
deporting so-called “criminal aliens”20 and inflicting federal funding cuts
on the so-called “sanctuary cities” that President Trump accused of
shielding such “criminal aliens” from removal. 21 His administration has
added to the vast number of ICE arrests and deportations already
occurring, particularly of noncitizens convicted of crimes. 22
In Part II, I outline the Supreme Court cases that have established the
right to a prompt probable cause hearing in the criminal justice system
when a suspect is arrested without a warrant.23 I compare these rights to
[https://perma.cc/8QXB-B8AD] [hereinafter Enforcement Memo] (supporting the idea that
the most efficient way to detain aliens who commit crimes is to replace existing ICE detainer
forms with new ones).
19
Jonathan Blitzer, What Will Trump Do with Half a Million Backlogged Immigration Cases?,
NEW YORKER (June 20, 2017), https://www.newyorker.com/news-desk/what-will-trumpdo-with-half-a-million-backlogged-immigration-cases [http://perma.cc/2A5G-GACP].
20
See Ben Casselman, There Aren’t 2 To 3 Million Undocumented Immigrants With Criminal
Records For Trump To Deport, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Nov. 14, 2016), http://fivethirtyeight.com/
features/there-arent-2-to-3-million-undocumented-immigrants-with-criminal-records-fortrump-to-deport/ [http://perma.cc/6AC7-HH2N] (analyzing President Trump’s wish to
deport two to three million immigrants who have committed crimes). See also Michelle Ye
Hee Lee, Trump’s Fuzzy Math on Undocumented Immigrants Convicted of Crimes, WASH. POST
(Sept. 2, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/fact-checker/wp/2016/09/02/
trumps-fuzzy-math-on-undocumented-immigrants-convicted-of-crimes/?utm_term=7d87b
fa2cacb [http://perma.cc/H9X7-LHTW] (clarifying that President Trump has called for the
removal of all criminal aliens since 2015).
21
See Enhancing Public Safety, supra note 17, at 8799 (declaring that all jurisdictions not
in compliance with Federal law will not receive federal funds beyond what is required by
law).
22
See Anna D. Law, This Is How Trump’s Deportations Differ From Obama’s, WASH. POST
(May 3, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2017/05/03/
this-is-how-trumps-deportations-differ-from-obamas/?utm_term=a6457ef2e550
[http://perma.cc/E4Y8-35WQ] (illustrating that Trump’s administration continues to
apprehend immigrants who have convicted crimes). See also Department of Homeland
Security, Table 41. Aliens Removed by Criminal Status and Region and Country of Nationality:
Fiscal Year 2015, HOMELAND SECURITY (Dec. 15, 2016), https://www.dhs.gov/
immigrationstatistics/yearbook/2019/table41 [https://perma.cc/23EN-JJN2] (noting the
number of deported immigrants who committed crimes in 2015). DHS maintains statistics
of “aliens removed by criminal status,” which it refers to as the removal of anyone who has
a prior criminal conviction. Id. In Fiscal Year 2015, of the 333,341 total number of persons
removed, 139,950 were previously convicted of a crime. Id. See also Department of
Homeland Security, Table 33. Aliens Apprehended: Fiscal Years 1925 to 2015, HOMELAND
SECURITY (Dec. 15, 2016), https://www.dhs.gov/immigration-statistics/yearbook/2015/
table33 [http://perma.cc/PUF6-KHRN ] (exposing the number of aliens apprehended in
2015). In the same year, ICE arrested 462,388 individuals. Id.
23
See infra Part II (highlighting cases that have established that in the criminal justice
system, when a suspect is arrested without a warrant, she has a right to a prompt probable
cause hearing).

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol52/iss2/2

Holper: Promptly Proving the Need to Detain for Post-Entry Social Control

2018]

Social Control Deportation

237

the immigration system’s statutory and regulatory scheme regarding
warrantless arrests, detention, and review of these decisions by an
immigration judge.24 In Part III, I describe court challenges in which
noncitizens claimed the right to a prompt probable cause hearing to justify
detention pending deportation. Although these challenges have not won
such a right, I discuss how the issue remains an open question. 25 In Part
IV, I examine why courts would take a fresh look at a right to a prompt
probable cause hearing, particularly in light of Supreme Court cases such
as Padilla v. Kentucky26 in 2010, Zadvydas v. Davis27 in 2001, and dicta from
Arizona v. United States 28 in 2012. The success of the ICE detainer litigation
is yet another reason for courts to reexamine this issue.29 In Part V, I
discuss my proposal in more detail, and justify why such prompt probable
cause hearings should only happen in post-entry social control cases.30
II. CRIMINAL JUSTICE RIGHTS COMPARED TO IMMIGRATION RIGHTS
It is first helpful to compare what occurs when a warrantless arrests
happens within the criminal justice system, as opposed to the immigration
system.31
A. Rights After Warrantless Arrest in the Criminal Justice System
In the criminal justice system, a probable cause hearing within fortyeight hours of arrest is necessary to ensure that an arrestee’s Fourth

24
See infra Part II (analogizing the criminal justice system to the immigration system
regarding arrests without a warrant, detention, and judicial review of hearings of that
nature).
25
See infra Part III (considering the possibility of noncitizens obtaining the right to a
prompt probable cause hearing).
26
See 559 U.S. 356, 374 (2010) (deciding that counsel must inform her client if his plea puts
him at risk of deportation).
27
See 533 U.S. 678, 669–700 (2001) (explaining that if a removal is not reasonably
foreseeable that continued detention should be considered unreasonable and should not be
authorized by statute).
28
See 567 U.S. 387, 396 (2012) (highlighting the procedure of a removal of an alien from
the United States).
29
See ACLU Immigrants’ Rights Project, Recent Court Decisions Relating to ICE Detainers,
ACLU
(July
27,
2015),
https://www.aclu.org/other/recent-ice-detainer-cases
[http://perma.cc/DD6U-6DYV] (summarizing recent cases concerning ICE detainers).
30
See infra Part V (opining that prompt probable cause hearings only take place in postentry social control cases).
31
See infra Part II.A–B (comparing warrantless arrest in the criminal justice system with
warrantless arrest in the immigration system).
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Amendment rights are not violated.32 This probable cause hearing is
different from the later arraignment.33
The Fourth Amendment provides that “[t]he right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue,
but upon probable cause.”34 In 1948, in Johnson v. United States, the
Supreme Court decided that to implement the Fourth Amendment’s
protection against unfounded invasions of liberty and privacy, whenever
possible, the existence of probable cause must be decided by a neutral and
detached magistrate.35 The Court wrote:
The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is not
grasped by zealous officers, is not that it denies law
enforcement the support of the usual inferences which
reasonable men draw from evidence. Its protection
consists in requiring that those inferences be drawn by a
neutral and detached magistrate instead of being judged
by the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise
of ferreting out crime.36
Similarly, in the Court’s 1968 decision in Terry v. Ohio, which allowed the
police to stop and frisk a person in search of weapons when the officer has
“reasonable suspicion,”37 the Court wrote:

See County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 56 (1991) (rationalizing a 48-hour
time period to await a probable cause hearing as complying with the promptness standard
set forth in Gerstein). See also Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 114 (1975) (rendering a decision
that a probable cause hearing must occur before an extended constraint of liberty after arrest
to comply with the Fourth Amendment).
33
See Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 106 (holding that arraignment, which happens often 30 days
after arrest, is insufficient to satisfy an arrestee’s Fourth Amendment rights). But see
Riverside, 500 U.S. at 58 (reasoning that probable cause hearing and arraignment could be
combined so long as the proceedings occurred within forty-eight hours).
34
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
35
See Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13–14 (stating that to comply with Fourth
Amendment rights a neutral magistrate must draw inferences based on the evidence).
36
Id. See also Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 97 (1964) (expressing preference for use of
warrants, stating, “‘good faith on the part of the arresting officer is not enough.’ . . . If
subjective good faith alone were the test, the protections of the Fourth Amendment would
evaporate, and the people would be ‘secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects,’ only
in the discretion of the police.”).
37
See Terry v. United States, 392 U.S. 1, 20–22 (1968) (agreeing that police officers may
stop and frisk someone in search of weapons if they have a reasonable suspicion). See also
Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F.Supp.2d 540, 627–28 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (declaring that the
practice of stop and frisk is not always constitutional). In 2013, a district court judge in the
Southern District of New York ruled that while stop and frisk is constitutional under Terry,
32
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The scheme of the Fourth Amendment becomes
meaningful only when it is assured that at some point the
conduct of those charged with enforcing the laws can be
subjected to the more detached, neutral scrutiny of a
judge who must evaluate the reasonableness of a
particular search or seizure in light of the particular
circumstances.38
In 1975, in Gerstein v. Pugh, the Supreme Court specifically rejected a
Florida procedure whereby a person could remain detained so long as a
prosecutor filed an information. 39 In describing the state court’s
interpretations of its criminal procedure laws, the Court wrote, “[a]s a
result, a person charged by information could be detained for a substantial
period solely on the decision of a prosecutor.” 40 The Court found that such
detention violated a suspect’s Fourth Amendment rights. 41 Thus, to
continue detention after initial arrest, the detached judgment of a
magistrate judge is necessary; the prosecutor’s finding of probable cause
is insufficient to protect Fourth Amendment rights.42 This Fourth
Amendment rule applies to “any significant pretrial restraint on liberty.”43
The Gerstein Court allowed few procedural rights in this probable
cause hearing, reasoning that the “. . . sole issue is whether there is
probable cause for detaining the arrested person pending further
proceedings. This issue can be determined reliably without an adversary
hearing.”44 Thus, the probable cause hearing could be held without the

the New York City police where implementing “stop and frisk” in a manner that was
unconstitutional. Id.
38
Terry, 392 U.S. at 21.
39
See Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 118–19 (explaining that a person cannot be detained so long as
a prosecutor has filed an information). There was a Florida statute that “seemed to authorize
adversary preliminary hearings to test probable cause for detention in all case . . . But the
Florida courts had held that the filling of an information foreclosed the suspect’s right to a
preliminary hearing.” Id. at 105–06. Florida courts also had held that habeas corpus could
only be used in exceptional circumstances to test the probable cause for detention under an
information. Id. at 106. There were two ways to obtain a judicial determination of probable
cause: first, by a special statute allowing a preliminary hearing after thirty days; and second,
by arraignment, which was often delayed a month or more after arrest. Id.
40
Id.
41
See Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 117 (finding a Florida law that made detainment for a substantial
amount of time acceptable if the prosecutor decided so violates the Fourth Amendment).
42
See id. (holding that it is unconstitutional for a prosecutor’s finding of proximate cause
alone to be grounds for continued detention and a neutral magistrate is necessary to consider
the evidence).
43
Id. at 125 (emphasis added).
44
Id.
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appointment of counsel and without the Sixth Amendment right to
confront one’s accuser (thus hearsay is admissible). 45
In 1991, in County of Riverside v. McLaughlin,46 the Court clarified what
would constitute a “timely” judicial determination of probable cause is
forty-eight hours.47 The Court wrote that “the Fourth Amendment
permits a reasonable postponement of a probable cause determination
while the police cope with the everyday problems of processing suspects
through an overly burdened criminal justice system.48 But flexibility has
its limits; Gerstein is not a blank check.”49 The Court wrote that even if
probable cause hearings are provided within forty-eight hours, there may
still be “unreasonable delays”—for example, “delays for the purpose of
gathering additional evidence to justify the arrest, a delay motivated by ill
will against the arrested individual, or delay for delay’s sake.” 50 The
Court held that the county could combine probable cause determinations
with arraignments, but that was not a reason to delay the probable cause
hearing.51
The Court’s reasoning in Gerstein and Riverside had its roots in two
cases decided years earlier.52 In McNabb v. United States, the Court in 1943
suppressed statements taken from a defendant who was detained for
fourteen hours, never taken to a judge (although a federal statute required
such judicial intervention), and repeatedly interrogated. 53 Although the
Court found a violation of a federal statute, not the Fourth Amendment,
that statute provided a similar guarantee that a defendant be taken before
the nearest judicial officer.54 In Mallory v. United States, the Court in 1957
interpreted Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 5(a) to require the
45
See id. at 121–22 (endorsing that a probable cause determination does not require
appointment of counsel and that confrontation of the accuser is not useful in a probable cause
determination).
46
See 500 U.S. 44, 47 (1991) (determining the definition of promptness under Gerstein).
47
See id. at 56 (conducting a probable cause hearing within forty-eight hours meets the
promptness requirement set forth in in Gerstein).
48
Id. at 55.
49
Id.
50
Id. at 56.
51
See id. at 58–59 (explaining that probable cause determinations and arraignments can be
combined, but that the combination does not justify a delay that exceeds the forty-eight hour
limit).
52
See Wendy L. Brandes, Post-Arrest Detention and the Fourth Amendment: Refining the
Standard of Gerstein v. Pugh, 22 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 445, 448 (1989) (describing the
Court’s rulings in McNabb, and Mallory as the “roots” for the Court’s decision in Gerstein).
53
See 318 U.S. 332, 342–47 (1943) (exposing that McNabb was detained for a period of
fourteen hours, was not taken to a judge, and was repeatedly interrogated).
54
See id. at 342 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 595 that states it is the responsibility of the officer who
arrested the person charged with a crime to take that person to the nearest judicial officer
with jurisdiction for a hearing).
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suppression of statements that were made while a defendant was detained
by the police before being brought before a neutral magistrate as required
by the rule.55 Repeating its rationale from McNabb, the Court reasoned
that “unwarranted detention led to tempting utilization of intensive
interrogation,”56 which the Court could not sanction.57 The Court’s
McNabb-Mallory rationale echoed in its later decisions in Gerstein and
Riverside, since the Court reasoned that “[t]he awful instruments of the
criminal law cannot be entrusted to a single functionary,”58 and that
“[l]egislation such as this, requiring that the police must with reasonable
promptness show legal cause for detaining arrested persons, constitutes
an important safeguard . . .”59
B. Warrantless Arrests and Procedures in the Immigration System
In the immigration system, ICE—the police, not the prosecutor—can
arrest someone without a warrant and decide, within forty-eight hours,
whether to issue a Notice to Appear (NTA) (the deportation system’s
equivalent of an information)60 and whether to detain that person.61 From
there on out, nothing has to happen quickly—in fact, a statutory provision
that is meant to ensure ample time for detainees to obtain counsel 62
indicates that an initial master calendar hearing (the deportation system’s
equivalent of an arraignment) should happen ten days after the NTA is
served on the detainee.63 As a result, a person could be detained for a
substantial period on the decision of an ICE officer.64
55
See Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449, 451–52, 455–56 (1957) (citing Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure 5(a), which requires a person making an arrest within the United States
to take the defendant without unnecessary delay before a magistrate judge, or before a state
or local judicial officer).
56
Id. at 452–53.
57
See id. at 455 (reversing and remanding prolonged interrogation for unnecessary delay
in bringing petitioner before commissioner because of recognized evils in such interrogation
techniques (citing McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 343–44, 363 (1943)).
58
Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 118 (1975). See also County of Riverside v. McLaughlin,
500 U.S. 44, 47–59 (1991) (finding county’s policy holding detainees over the weekend
unconstitutional for exceeding forty-eight hour period of detention).
59
McNabb, 318 U.S. at 343–44.
60
See 8 C.F.R. § 239.1(a) (2016) (showing that the NTA is the document that commences
removal proceedings). See also Riverside, 500 U.S. at 57–59 (finding detentions without a
warrant exceeded the constitutional limit of forty-eight hours).
61
See 8 C.F.R. § 287.3(d) (2016) (outlining custody proceedings for noncitizens arrested
without a warrant and detention procedures and exceptions).
62
See 8 U.S.C. § 1229(b)(1) (2012) (permitting noncitizen time to secure counsel).
63
See id. (delaying the hearing provides an opportunity for the detainee to secure counsel).
64
See Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 106 (“As a result [of Florida courts’ interpretation of the state’s
criminal procedure laws], a person charged by information could be detained for a
substantial period solely on the decision of a prosecutor.”).
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The statute, 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a), outlines ICE’s power without a
warrant, which, among other powers,65 includes the power:
[T]o arrest any alien who in his presence or view is
entering or attempting to enter the United States in
violation of any law or regulation made in pursuance of
law regulating the admission, exclusion, expulsion, or
removal of aliens, or to arrest any alien in the United
States, if he has reason to believe that the alien so arrested
is in the United States in violation of any such law or
regulation and is likely to escape before a warrant can be
obtained for his arrest, but the alien arrested shall be
taken without unnecessary delay for examination before
an officer of the Service having authority to examine
aliens as to their right to enter or remain in the United
States.66
ICE officers thus can make warrantless arrests and refer the case first to an
“officer of the Service having authority to examine aliens” and then to an
immigration judge.67
One immigration regulation, 8 C.F.R. § 287.3(d), requires ICE to make
two decisions within forty-eight hours of arrest (except when there are
emergency or extraordinary circumstances): (1) whether to issue a NTA;
and (2) whether to release the person on bond. 68 The NTA is issued once
65
See 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(1)–(3) (2012) (giving immigration officers the power to make
warrantless interrogations of immigrants). For example, ICE may: without a warrant,
interrogate a noncitizen “believed to be an alien” about his or her right to remain in the
United States; arrest a noncitizen who in the officer’s presence or view is entering or
attempting to enter the United States in violation of the law; board vessels or vehicles near
the border for the purpose of patrolling the border; and make arrests for immigration lawrelated felonies or other felonies cognizable under the laws of the United States if there’s a
likelihood of escape before a warrant can be obtained. Id.
66
Id.
67
8 C.F.R. § 287.3(b) (2016). If “there is prima facie evidence that the arrested [noncitizen]
was entering, attempting to enter, or is present in the United States in violation of the
immigration laws, the examining officer will refer the case to an immigration judge for
further inquiry . . . , order the [noncitizen] removed as provided for in section 235(b)(1) of
the Act and § 235.3(b) of this chapter, or take whatever other action may be appropriate or
required under the laws or regulations applicable to the particular case.” Id.
68
See 8 C.F.R. § 287.3(d) (2016) (laying out the custody procedures for noncitizens’
warrantless arrest). This forty-eight hour rule was created in 1997, following the passage of
the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) and originally
required these decisions to be made within twenty-four hours. See Inspection and Expedited
Removal of Aliens; Detention and Removal of Aliens; Conduct of Removal Proceedings;
Asylum Procedures, 62 Fed Reg. 10312, 10390 (1997) (inserting 8 C.F.R. § 287.3(d) without
discussion). Following the September 11, 2011 attacks, the regulation was amended, without
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an ICE officer has confirmed the existence of prima facie evidence for
removal.69 The regulation requires that it be a different ICE officer (not
the arresting officer) who makes the prima facie evidence determination,
although “[i]f no other qualified officer is readily available and the taking
of the alien before another officer would entail unnecessary delay, the
arresting officer, if the conduct of such examination is a part of the duties
assigned to him or her, may examine the alien.” 70 Notice that this
regulation makes no provision for review of these important decisions by
an independent immigration judge. 71 Rather, the regulation specifically
does not require that the examining officer be an immigration judge,
because the regulation later makes reference to an immigration judge. 72
This regulation allows ICE—the police, not the prosecutor—to make the

comment, to expand the time frame from twenty-four hours to forty-eight hours, but to
include a provision allowing for this timeline to be extended “in the event of an emergency
or other extraordinary circumstance in which case a determination will be made within an
additional reasonable period of time.” 66 Fed. Reg. 48334, 48335 (2001). Shoba Sivaprasad
Wadhia has critiqued the DOJ for failing to define “emergency,” “extraordinary
circumstance,” or “additional reasonable period of time.” Wadhia, supra note 4, at 874.
Professor Wadhia describes how Asa Hutchison, then Undersecretary of Border and
Transportation Security, in 2004 responded to criticism of this regulation by issuing a policy
directing that during non-emergencies, detained noncitizens should be charged within fortyeight hours of their arrest and served with an NTA within seventy-two hours of such arrest.
Id. 874–76 (citing Memorandum from Asa Hutchison, Undersecretary, Border and
Transportation Security, to Michael J. Garcia, Assistant Secretary, U.S. Immigration and
Customs Enforcement and Robert Bonner, Commissioner, U.S. Customs and Border
Protection (Mar. 30, 2004)). See also Immigrant Rights Clinic, New York University, Indefinite
Detention Without Probable Cause: A Comment on INS Interim Rule 8 C.F.R. § 287.3, 26 N.Y.U.
REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 397, 398 (2000–01) (critiquing new rule as providing no definition of
“emergency” or “extraordinary circumstances,” nor any explanation of how long an
“additional reasonable period” of detention may be).
69
See 8 C.F.R. § 287.3(a)–(b) (2016) (detailing the examination and determination of
proceedings for noncitizens arrested without warrants).
70
Id.
71
See 8 C.F.R. § 287.3(d) (2016) (“Unless voluntary departure has been granted pursuant
to subpart C of 8 CFR part 240, a determination will be made within forty-eight hours of the
arrest, except in the event of an emergency or other extraordinary circumstance in which
case a determination will be made within an additional reasonable period of time, whether
the alien will be continued in custody or released on bond or recognizance and whether a
notice to appear and warrant of arrest as prescribed in 8 CFR parts 236 and 239 will be
issued.”).
72
See 8 C.F.R. § 287.3(b) (2016) (“If the examining officer is satisfied that there is prima
facie evidence that the arrested alien was entering, attempting to enter, or is present in the
United States in violation of the immigration laws, the examining officer will refer the case to
an immigration judge for further inquiry in accordance with 8 CFR parts 235, 239, or 240, order
the alien removed as provided for in section 235(b)(1) of the Act and § 235.3(b) of this chapter,
or take whatever other action may be appropriate or required under the laws or regulations
applicable to the particular case.” (emphasis added)).
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determination of removability and gives discretion to ICE to make the first
detention decision.73
The statute requires that ten days lapse between the service of the
NTA, which details (in English) why someone is removable from the
United States and contains notification of certain rights and
responsibilities,74 and the first master calendar hearing, so that the
noncitizen can obtain counsel.75 The statute also states that “[i]n the case
of an alien who is convicted of an offense which makes the alien
deportable, the Attorney General shall begin any removal proceeding as
expeditiously as possible after the date of the conviction.”76 However, this
section hardly speaks to the speed at which someone should be brought
before a judge.77
An example is helpful to explain what sorts of delays may occur
before ICE must prove that a noncitizen is actually deportable for a
73
See 8 C.F.R. § 287.3(a)–(b) (allowing an officer to examine and use discretion to order
removal). See also Hernández, supra note 5, at 882 (comparing criminal justice and
immigration process, where the government can “merely lodge an accusation that a person
has violated the law”).
74
See 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a)(1) (2012) (stating the specification for a NTA). An NTA must
specify:
(A) The nature of the proceedings against the [noncitizen][;] (B) The
legal authority under which the proceedings are conducted[;] (C) The
acts or conduct alleged to be in violation of law[;] (D) The charges
against the alien and the statutory provisions alleged to have been
violated[;] (E) [That the noncitizen] may be represented by counsel and
the alien will be provided (i) a period of time to secure counsel under
subsection (b)(1) and (ii) a current list of [legal services;] (F)(i) The
requirement that the [noncitizen] must immediately provide (or have
provided) the Attorney General with a written record of an address and
telephone number (if any) at which the alien may be contacted
respecting [removal] proceedings[;] (ii) The requirement that the
[noncitizen] must provide the Attorney General immediately with a
written record of any change of the alien’s address or telephone
number[;] (iii) The consequences under section 1229a(b)(5)…of failure
to provide address and telephone information pursuant to this
subparagraph; (G) (i) The time and place at which the proceedings will
be held[; and] (ii) The consequences under section 8 USCS § 1229a(b)(5)
of the failure, except under exceptional circumstances, to appear at such
proceedings.
Id.
75
See 8 U.S.C. § 1229(b)(1) (“In order that an alien be permitted the opportunity to secure
counsel before the first hearing date in proceedings under section [240 8 U.S.C.S. §]
1229a . . . the hearing date shall not be scheduled earlier than ten days after the service of the
notice to appear, unless the alien requests in writing an earlier hearing date.”).
76
8 U.S.C. § 1229(d)(1) (2012).
77
See 8 U.S.C. § 1229(d)(2) (2012) (“Nothing in this subsection shall be construed to create
any substantive or procedural right or benefit that is legally enforceable by any party against
the United States or its agencies or officers or any other person.”).
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criminal conviction.78 Carlos,79 a lawful permanent resident from the
Dominican Republic, was detained on August 14 and was issued a NTA
that charged him as removable for two crimes involving moral
turpitude.80 After being detained for a few weeks (the statute requires at
least ten days so he can get a lawyer),81 he appears before a neutral
immigration judge, who gives him a few continuances to find a lawyer.82
On September 16, he finally has a pro bono lawyer to enter an appearance
on his behalf.83 Once Carlos obtains counsel, his counsel writes a motion
to terminate removal proceedings, arguing that at least one of his
convictions is not a “crime involving moral turpitude” and therefore he is
not deportable at all.84 On October 7, ICE withdraws that charge of
removability, and issues another, claiming he is also removable for a crime
of domestic violence.85 His counsel files another motion to terminate
based on the new charges, and the judge, after allowing time for both sides
to brief the issue, on November 4 finds him removable and begins the
process of taking applications for relief from removal. 86 It is almost

See generally 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a) (2012) (enumerating status violations and crimes that
place noncitizens in classes qualifying them as deportable).
79
The case details and timeline are taken from the case of a client represented by the
Boston College Immigration Clinic. The client’s name and country of origin has been
changed, however, to protect his privacy.
80
See Mot. Terminate Proceedings 3:2–5 (reflecting the Author’s experience, and a
redacted version of this motion is on file with the Valparaiso University Law Review). See, e.g.,
8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii) (2012) (showing that a noncitizen with multiple criminal
convictions is deportable).
81
See Notice to Appear 2:4–6 (Aug. 1, 2007) (illustrating the Author’s experience, and a
redacted version of this motion is on file with the Valparaiso University Law Review). See, e.g.,
8 U.S.C. § 1229(b)(1) (2012) (providing a noncitizen the opportunity to secure counsel).
82
See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.29 (2016) (permitting an immigration judge upon on a good cause
showing to grant a continuance).
83
See 8 U.S.C. § 1229(b)(1) (2012) (prolonging the procedural process so a noncitizen can
secure counsel).
84
See Mot. Terminate Proceedings 5–6, 8–11 (showing the Author’s experience, and a
redacted version of this motion is on file with the Valparaiso University Law Review). See, e.g.,
8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) (2012) (classifying noncitizen “convicted of a crime involving
moral turpitude” as deportable).
85
See Additional Charges of Inadmissibility/Deportability 1–3 (Oct. 1, 2015) (detailing the
Author’s experience, and a redacted version of this motion is on file with the Valparaiso
University Law Review). See also 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i) (2012) (enumerating that
noncitizens convicted of domestic violence crimes are deportable). At any time during the
removal proceedings, DHS may amend the notice to appear; 8 C.F.R. § 1240.10(e) (2016)
(explaining additional charges may be lodged against a noncitizen at any time during the
proceeding).
86
See Mot. Terminate Proceedings 17–31; Order to Terminate 1–7 (reflecting the Author’s
experience, and a redacted version of this motion is on file with the Valparaiso University Law
Review). See generally 8 U.S.C. § 1229 (2012) (beginning procedures to remove deportable
noncitizen).
78
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thirteen weeks between when he is detained and when the judge decides
that he is actually removable (which is what justifies his detention).87
Detention decisions happen in tandem with these removability
decisions and begin with ICE.88 The regulations permit any ICE officer
who has arrest authority to conduct an initial custody review. 89 In this
review, thanks to a 1997 regulation that I have critiqued elsewhere,90 the
detainee bears the burden of proving to the ICE officer that he is not a
danger or a flight risk.91 There is an opportunity for de novo review of
ICE’s detention decision by a neutral immigration judge.92 Frequently, the
first opportunity that a detainee has for a neutral judge to review ICE’s
decision to detain is at a bond hearing.93 But as I have noted elsewhere,
that bond hearing is hardly the model vindication of procedural rights, as
the detainee bears the burden of proving he is not a danger or a flight
risk,94 and judges routinely rely on unreliable hearsay evidence such as
police reports to prove dangerousness. 95 In cases where there are any
prior criminal arrests, the central question at the bond hearing becomes

See Kagan, supra note 6, at 163 (referencing a confidential case where a lawful
permanent resident was detained for two and a half months based on a legally baseless
arrest).
88
See generally 8 C.F.R. § 236.1 (2016) (outlining procedures from the time the officer issues
a warrant through detention and the various aspects of a particular case being analyzed
simultaneously).
89
See 8 C.F.R. § 236.1(c)(8) (2016) (“Any officer authorized to issue a warrant of arrest may,
in the officer’s discretion, release an alien not described in section 236(c)(1) of the Act, under
the conditions at section 236(a)(2) and (3) of the Act; provided that the alien must
demonstrate to the satisfaction of the officer that such release would not pose a danger to
property or persons, and that the alien is likely to appear for any future proceeding. Such
an officer may also, in the exercise of discretion, release an alien in deportation proceedings
pursuant to the authority in section 242 of the Act (as designated before April 1, 1997), except
as otherwise provided by law.”).
90
See Mary Holper, The Beast of Burden in Immigration Bond Hearings, 67 CASE W. RES. L.
REV. 75, 90–91 (2016) (pointing out flaws in the regulation and the explanation provided by
INS).
91
Compare Holper, Beast of Burden, supra note 90, at 90–91, with 8 C.F.R. § 236.1(c)(8) (2016)
(allowing an officer to use discretion to release a noncitizen detainee if the noncitizen satisfies
the burden showing that noncitizen is not a danger).
92
See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19 (a), (b), (f) (2016) (permitting review by an immigration judge and
appeal of the immigration judge’s custody decision to the Board of Immigration Appeals).
93
See De La Cruz, 20 I. & N. Dec. 346, 359–60 (Heilman, J., dissenting) (“Unlike the
criminal justice system, the initial decision to jail a person is made by the very law
enforcement agency which ordered the arrest. There is no impartial magistrate or judge
involved at that stage. The [bond] hearing before the immigration judge offers the first
opportunity for an alien to appear before an impartial trier of fact.”).
94
See generally Holper, supra note 90, at 76, 105–06, 109, 111, 117–19, 122–30 (detailing the
noncitizen’s burden to prove that flight is not an issue).
95
See Holper, supra note 2, at 678 nn.11 & 16, 679 n.23, 682 n.35 (citing multiple personal
experiences where an immigration judge deferred to the police report on file).
87
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whether this person is a danger to the community.96 Flight risk is a
secondary concern; only after a detainee has passed the hurdle of proving
non-dangerousness may the judge consider whether the detainee will
come back to court.97
Even if all of this happens quickly—ICE writes the NTA, charging
removability; ICE makes an initial detention decision; the immigration
judge holds an initial master calendar hearing—the government still never
has to justify detention to anyone. 98 Recall that the burden of proof is on
the detainee, not the government, at that bond hearing where a neutral
judge first considers whether to continue detention. 99 That means that
there will necessarily be delays before this bond hearing happens. What
sorts of delays are typical?100
Juan, within two days of arrest, was issued a NTA and a Notice of
Custody Determination, which said he will be detained without bond. 101
Because he had no lawyer, he did not want to sign anything, so he did not
sign the form asking for a quick hearing. 102 The statutorily-required ten
days went by before he saw an immigration judge for the first time. 103 He
now sees the judge two weeks after he was arrested.104 Wishing to present
the best possible argument to the judge but not having money to pay a
lawyer,105 Juan asked for a continuance to find a pro bono lawyer to
96
See Urena, 25 I. & N. Dec. 140, 140–42 (BIA 2009) (remanding for an immigration judge
to find if detainee with prior criminal record met burden of proof that he was not a danger
to the community); Holper, Beast of Burden, supra note 90, at 128 (“many immigration bond
hearings begin and end with a dangerousness finding.”).
97
See Holper, Beast of Burden, supra note 90, at 128 n.258 (finding dangerousness
necessitates a higher standard of proof than flight risk).
98
See Urena, 25 I. & N. Dec. 140, 140–42 (holding the detainee, not the government, has
the burden of proof).
99
See, e.g., Matter of Fatahi, 26 I. & N. Dec. 791, 793 (BIA 2016) (finding a detainee at a
custody hearing must show the immigration judge “that he is not ‘a threat to national
security, a danger to the community at large, likely to abscond, or otherwise a poor bail risk’”
(quoting Guerra, 24 I. & N. Dec. 37, 40 (BIA 2006)).
100
See, e.g., Holper, supra note 2, at 678 nn.11 & 16, 679 n.23. (describing these delays using
my own experiences representing detainees in bond hearings before the Boston Immigration
Court). As director of the Boston College Immigration Clinic and faculty supervisor for the
Boston College Immigration Law Group Bond project, my students and I have represented
numerous detainees in their bond hearings.
101
See 8 C.F.R. § 236.1 (2016) (explaining the process of issuing Notice of Custody
Determination). See also 8 C.F.R. § 239.1 (2016) (outlining the process of NTA).
102
Cf. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(4)(A) (2012) (allowing time for a noncitizen to appoint counsel).
103
See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.14(a) (2016) (describing when proceedings before an immigration
judge can commence). The detainee has a right to request a bond hearing without waiting
for a master calendar hearing, but many pro se detainees may not realize this. See Wadhia,
supra note 4, at 876 (reporting the procedural timeframe is unclear to many detainees).
104
See Wadhia, supra note 4, at 876.
105
See generally Mark Noferi, Cascading Constitutional Deprivation: The Right to Appointed
Counsel for Mandatorily Detained Immigrants Pending Removal Proceedings, 18 MICH. J. RACE &
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represent him. Although he indicated his desire to ask for a bond, the
judge warned him that he has only one opportunity to do so, 106 so Juan
decided to wait. Two weeks went by. Now having the luck of finding a
pro bono lawyer, Juan needed more time to gather evidence to disprove his
own dangerousness and flight risk. 107 Two more weeks went by.108 Juan’s
counsel, having scrambled for two weeks to gather evidence, appeared at
the hearing with a packet of supporting letters.109 The government
attorney said she needed time to read such a large packet.110 Another
week went by.111 The government, not being required to provide any
evidence to Juan’s counsel ahead of time, 112 submitted a large packet to
the judge at the hearing, which contained harmful evidence that Juan’s
counsel had not yet seen.113 Juan’s counsel, wishing to review this
information with her client and not wishing for the judge to be reading it
during her entire bond argument, requested a continuance.114 One more
week went by. Ten weeks after Juan was first detained, a neutral judge
finally decided whether he should be released on bond.
Does this long period of time before which detention is reviewed by a
neutral judge not violate the Fourth Amendment’s right to a prompt
L. 63, 121 (2012) (arguing for limited right to court-appointed counsel for Joseph hearings, in
which it is determined whether the detainee is properly included within a mandatory
detention category).
106
See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19(e) (2016) (“After an initial bond redetermination, an alien’s
request for a subsequent bond redetermination shall be made in writing and shall be
considered only upon a showing that the alien’s circumstances have changed materially
since the prior bond redetermination.”).
107
See, e.g., Urena, 25 I. & N. Dec. 140, 141 (BIA 2009) (demonstrating the burden remains
on the detainee to overcome presumptions of dangerousness and flight risk).
108
See 8 U.S.C. § 1229(b)(1) (2012) (allowing noncitizens time to secure counsel before
beginning procedures).
109
This reflects the Author’s personal experiences. See, e.g., Castaneda v. Aitken, 2015 WL
3882755, at * 2 (N. D. Ca. June 23, 2015) (describing bond support packet, which included “28
letters of support from family and community members, proof of enrollment in a 90-day
inpatient rehabilitation program, and testified that he had been sober in detention for close
to nine months”).
110
This reflects the Author’s personal experiences. See, e.g., Basua, 3 OCAHO no. 547, 1442,
1444–45 (1993) (requesting extension of time to respond to packet of documents submitted
as supporting evidence).
111
This reflects the Author’s personal experiences. See, e.g., Basua, 3 OCAHO no. 547, 1442,
1445 (1993) (allowing one week before issuing order).
112
See generally Geoffrey Heeren, Shattering the One-Way Mirror Discovery in Immigration
Court, 79 BROOK. L. REV. 1569, 1571 (2014) (critiquing the vast disparity in informationgathering, because “[i]n contrast to DHS’s formidable information-gathering powers, noncitizens in removal cases have few discovery options.”).
113
See, e.g., Casteneda, 2015 WL 3882755, at *2 (citing government submitting police
reports).
114
See id. (requesting a continuance to review documents submitted by a government
agency against a defendant in an immigration case).
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review of detention by a neutral judge? 115 In this next section, I seek to
explain this disparity in rights when one travels between the criminal
justice and immigration systems. 116
III. COURT CHALLENGES TO IMMIGRATION DETAINEE’S LACK OF PROMPT
PROBABLE CAUSE HEARING
Why do Fourth Amendment protections not come into play in the
immigration context in the same manner as they are applied in the
criminal context?117 The very short, easy answer to that question is that
immigration law is civil, not criminal.118 In the facetious words of Dan
Kanstroom, “they are not being punished, they are simply being
Because deportation is not punishment, Fourth
regulated.”119
Amendment rights and remedies can appear quite watered down.120 For
example, the Supreme Court, in its 1984 decision in INS v. LopezMendoza,121 refused to apply the exclusionary rule to the deportation
context, finding that it would only apply for egregious violations. 122 The
Court justified this limited availability of Fourth Amendment remedies
because deportation was civil.123

115
See Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 114 (1975) (holding that the Fourth Amendment
mandates a judicial determination of probable cause by a neutral judge before a suspect may
be detained for an extended period of time).
116
See Chacón, supra note 2, at 1604–05 (discussing the disparity in rights between criminal
and civil proceedings under the Fourth Amendment).
117
See id. (identifying how different provisions of the Fourth Amendment provide
different protections in the criminal sphere versus the civil sphere).
118
See Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 740 (1893) (holding that deportation is
not punishment).
119
See Kanstroom, supra note 11, at 1895 (discussing how deportation is not classified as
punishment because it is a civil penalty rather than a criminal one). In a presentation I gave
to a group of students from my law school’s prosecution and defense clinics, they were
surprised to hear that immigration, especially immigration detention, was considered
“civil,” especially after I described to them how immigration detainees are held in local jails,
subject to the exact same restraints as the rest of the criminal justice population.
120
See Holper, supra note 2, at 708 (“[i]mmigration law has seen all procedural protections
either guaranteed by statute, or, to the extent they are imposed constitutionally, filtered
through the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause where “fundamental fairness” dictates
whether a certain procedure is necessary. The “fundamental fairness” test has led to a
watering down of the protections available in a criminal case.”); Chacón, supra note 2, at
1604–05 (discussing the limited Fourth and Fifth Amendment protections that apply in the
immigration, as opposed to the criminal, context).
121
See 468 U.S. 1032, 1050 (1984) (discussing the necessity for detention to prevent an
individual facing deportation from taking retaliatory action).
122
Id. at 1050–51.
123
See id. at 1041–50 (applying test from United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433 (1976)).
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Detention is seen as a necessary part of the deportation process, which
itself is civil.124 As European immigration law scholar Daniel Wilshire has
noted, during the early debates of the U.S. government’s right to exclude
and expel noncitizens, “detention had never been separately considered
from the issue of expulsion,” which “proved to be a crucial omission”
because of the “distinct legal and moral concerns” raised by detention.125
So, the lack of a prompt probable cause hearing is yet another place where
detention—because it is embedded within the “civil” deportation
process—takes on the legal character of that process, without truly
examining the legal concerns with the detention itself.126 Appellate court
judges and Supreme Court justices, unfortunately writing in dissents,
have made this very critique. 127 In the words of Justice Brennan,
dissenting in the 1960 case Abel v. United States:
Even assuming that the power of Congress over aliens
may be as great as was said in Galvan v. Press, . . . and that
deportation may be styled “civil,” . . . it does not follow

124
See Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 538 (1952) (explaining how, without detention,
aliens could harm the United States during deportation proceedings); Wong Wing v. United
States, 163 U.S. 228, 235 (1896) (examining the potential harm aliens could cause during the
deportation process if detention was not allowed).
125
DANIEL WILSHIRE, IMMIGRATION DETENTION: LAW, HISTORY, POLITICS, 6 (Cambridge
Univ. Press 2012).
126
See César Cuauhtémoc & García Hernández, Immigration Detention as Punishment, 61
UCLA L. REV. 1346, 1358 (2014) (making formalist, rules-based argument that immigration
detention is punishment, rooting argument in immigration detention’s legislative history);
Anil Kalhan, Rethinking Immigration Detention, 110 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 42, 49 (2010)
(making functionalist critiques that immigration detention has been converted “into a quasipunitive regime far out of alignment with immigration custody’s permissible purposes”).
See generally Kagan, supra note 6, at 130 (discussing the unwarranted power given to
immigration authorities).
127
See, e.g., Flores by Galvez-Maldonado v. Meese, 913 F.2d 1315, 1399 (9th Cir. 1990)
(discussing the application of detention to deportable alien minors), vacated and superseded en
banc 942 F.2d 1352 (9th Cir. 1991), rev’d sub nom. Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292 (1993), remanded
to 992 F.2d 243 (9th Cir. 1993). For example, in Flores, Judge Fletcher dissented from the
panel’s decisions that unaccompanied minors in immigration detention had no right to a
prompt probable cause hearing and wrote:
In effect, the majority is moving from the uncontroverted propositions
that the political branches of plenary authority over deciding whom to
admit into the country and that such political decisions are largely
immune from judicial review, to the unsupportable conclusion that how
it treats those whom it detains while the deportation is underway is
likewise beyond judicial review. This is an unwarranted leap.
Id. at 1339 (Fletcher, J., dissenting).
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that Congress may strip aliens of the protections of the
Fourth Amendment . . . .128
Scholars such as César Cuauhtémoc, García Hernández, and Anil
Kalhan have rightfully critiqued immigration detention as punishment. 129
For those who truly believe that immigration detention is not punishment,
as the Supreme Court has held,130 I wonder whether they have ever spent
the day at one of the many other jails where ICE holds people and met
with those who are in immigration detention.131 If, after that, they still
consider this detention as “civil,” then I welcome the conversation. 132 For
the moment, however, I leave these important critiques aside; rather, I
wish to show how this (misguided) notion that immigration detention and
deportation are civil has caused courts to overlook a glaring Fourth
Amendment problem, the lack of a prompt probable cause hearing for
immigration detainees.133
A good place to start is the Supreme Court’s 1960 decision in Abel v.
United States.134 In Abel, the Court considered whether an arrest by
immigration authorities pursuant to an administrative warrant should
lead to suppression of the evidence under the Fourth Amendment.135 The
Court found that a judicial warrant within the scope of the Fourth
Amendment was not necessary to lawfully arrest a noncitizen for
Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217, 250 (Brennan, J., joined by Warren, J., Black, J., and
Douglas, J., dissenting) (citing Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522 (1954)).
129
See supra note 126 (exploring different methods of analysis, all of which lead to the
conclusion that detention is punishment).
130
See Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 235 (1896) (reasoning that detention is
merely a necessary part of the process of deportation, similar to an innocent person’s
temporary detention after being arrested).
131
See, e.g., Challenging Unconstitutional Conditions in CBP Detention Facilities, AM. IMMIGR.
COUNCIL (Sept. 14, 2017), https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/litigation/
challenging-unconstitutional-conditions-cbp-detention-facilities [https://perma.cc/6EQUNP7R] (explaining typical conditions in immigration detention facilities).
132
See Chi Thon Ngo v. INS, 192 F.3d 390, 398 (3d Cir. 1999) (citing Rodriguez-Fernandez
v. Wilkinson, 654 F.2d 1382, 1385 (10th Cir. 1981) (“[A]n alien whose detention occurs in a
maximum security federal prison may be forgiven for wondering when his punishment
stopped and detention began.”). See also Abira Ashfaq, We Have Given Them this Power:
Reflections of an Immigration Attorney, NEW POLITICS, Summer 2004, at 75 (“[i]t isn’t okay that
[a detainee] was imprisoned for [two weeks] more than he should because the INS could and
did ignore the immigration judge’s order [to release him]. I think the government trial
attorney should have to spend two weeks in [the jail] for the mistake because incarceration
is a big deal.”).
133
See Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 537–38 (1952) (discussing how deportation is a civil
matter).
134
See 362 U.S. 217, 250 (1960) (illuminating the Supreme Court’s decision in this 1960 case).
135
See id. at 230 (emphasizing that the Court’s consideration would be different if the
evidence had established that the administrative warrant was being employed as an
instrument of criminal law rather than deportation).
128
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deportation,136 reasoning that “[s]tatutes authorizing administrative arrest
to achieve detention pending deportation proceedings have the sanction
of time.”137 The Court’s statements about the Fourth Amendment rights
in the administrative arrests context was dicta, however, since the Court
repeatedly stated that the petitioner had waived the issue by not raising it
in prior stages of the litigation. 138 Thus, Abel, while problematic in its
dicta,139 is not a case where the issue of a prompt probable cause hearing
actually was decided.140
Circuit courts considering the issue of whether immigration detainees
have a right to a prompt probable cause hearing have decided that the
“decision to issue the NTA is the constitutional equivalent of a finding of
probable cause by a magistrate.”141 Judge Posner’s opinion in the 1982
case Arias v. Rogers is of particular interest.142 Considering a challenge to
the arrest without warrant procedures of the Immigration and
Naturalization Service (INS) (the precursor to ICE),143 Judge Posner
observed that the statute, 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(2), requires “that an alien

See id. at 232 (interpreting the language of the statute authorizing administrative arrest).
Id. at 230.
138
See Abel, 362 U.S. at 230 (“The claim that the administrative warrant by which petitioner
was arrested was invalid, because it did not satisfy the requirements for ‘warrants’ under the
Fourth Amendment, is not entitled to our consideration in the circumstances before us. It
was not made below; indeed, it was expressly disavowed.”). The court went to state that the
petition “did not challenge the exercise of [the warrant] authority below, but expressly
acknowledged its validity. Id. at 231. The court further explained that “[a]t no time did
petitioner question the legality of the administrative arrest procedure either as unauthorized
or unconstitutional. Such challenges were, to repeat, disclaimed.” Id. As a result, the court
concluded that “[a]ffirmative acceptance of what is now sought to be questioned could not
be plainer.” Id. at 232.
139
See id. at 246 (Douglas, J., and Black, J., dissenting) (“The tragedy in our approval of
these short cuts is that the protection afforded by the Fourth Amendment is removed from
an important segment of our life.”).
140
See Kagan, supra note 6, at 127 (discussing the constitutional problems inherent in the
ICE’s procedure to arrest immigrants without warrants or probable cause hearings).
141
See Min-Shey Hung v. United States, 617 F.2d 201, 202 (10th Cir. 1980) (finding
examination by authorized INS officer “basically the same as a criminal proceeding before a
magistrate on probable cause” and “sufficient to meet the constitutional standards and to
commence the deportation proceedings.”); Salgado v. Scannel, 561 F.2d 1211, 1212 (5th Cir.
1977) (“Salgado now argues that his May 18 affidavit [which was taken after INS arrested
him] should have been suppressed because he was arrested without a warrant and was not
taken before a magistrate. We find no merit in this contention. Under the express authority
of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(1) and (2), the warrantless arrest
was legal.”). Cf. United States v. Encarnacion, 239 F.3d 395, 400 (1st Cir. 2001) (holding that
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 5(a), which requires a prompt probable cause hearing,
does not protect detainees arrested for deportation under 1357(a)(2)).
142
See 676 F.2d 1139, 1141 (7th Cir. 1982) (discussing the applicability of habeas corpus to
detention once deportation proceedings have begun).
143
See infra note 150 (detailing change from INS to ICE).
136
137
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arrested without a warrant ‘be taken without unnecessary delay before an
officer of the Service having authority to examine aliens as to their right to
enter or remain in the United States.’”144 He wrote that “[t]he reference is
to a special inquiry officer, also called an immigration judge. . . [s]pecial
inquiry officers have judicial authority . . . and therefore correspond to the
committing magistrate in a criminal proceeding.”145 Posner also observed:
The statute and regulations do not define the authority of
the special inquiry officer when an alien who has been
arrested without a warrant pursuant to 8 U.S.C.
§ 1357(a)(2) is brought before him. But we assume (and
perhaps 8 C.F.R. § 287.3 implies) that he has the same
authority that a committing magistrate would have, and
that the special inquiry officer is explicitly given in 8
C.F.R. § 242.2(b) when the arrest is pursuant to a warrant,
to order the release of one who is detained illegally. 146
Posner appears to have been mistaken, as the Ninth Circuit later
pointed out.147 This confusion is understandable, given that he was
writing this passage one year before the Executive Office for Immigration
Review (EOIR) was created. In 1983, the EOIR finally divorced the former
INS from immigration judges, although both agencies remained within
the Department of Justice.148 When Judge Posner referred to “special
inquiry officers” in 1982, he was referencing the precursor to what today
is an immigration judge (situated in a separate agency). At the time,
however, special inquiry officers were part of the INS, but were given

See Arias, 676 F.2d at 1142 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(2) (2012)).
Id. (citing 8 C.F.R. § 242.8(a) (2017)).
146
Id. at 1143.
147
See Flores by Galvez-Maldonado v. Meese, 913 F.2d 1315, 1337 (9th Cir. 1990)
(discussing the application of detention to deportable alien minors), vacated and superseded en
banc 942 F.2d 1352 (9th Cir. 1991), rev’d sub nom. Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292 (1993), remanded
to 992 F.2d 243 (9th Cir. 1993). In the panel opinion in Flores, the Ninth Circuit cited Arias as
erroneously concluding that the examining officer mentioned in 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(2) was an
immigration judge rather than an INS official. Flores, 913 F.2d at 1337 (citing Arias v. Rogers,
676 F.2d 1139, 1142 (7th Cir.1982). The Panel concluded that Gerstein’s “neutral and
detached” magistrate requirement was inapplicable to deportation proceedings. Id. An en
banc panel of the Ninth Circuit reversed this decision, and the Supreme Court reversed the
Ninth Circuit. Flores by Galvez-Maldonado v. Meese, 942 F.2d 1352 (9th Cir. 1990), en banc,
rev’d sub nom. Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292 (1993).
148
See Sidney B. Rawitz, From Wong Yang Sung to Black Robes, 65 INTERP. REL. 453–59 (1988),
reprinted in STEPHEN E. LEGOMSKY AND CRISTINA M. RODRÍGUEZ, IMMIGRATION AND
REFUGEE LAW AND POLICY, Sixth Ed. 686, 686 (2015) (chronicling the history of the separation
of functions between the INS and what ultimately became IJs under the newly-created EOIR
in 1983).
144
145
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separate files than the INS prosecutors.149 With the changes that created
EOIR in 1983, immigration judges were never given the responsibility of
issuing or affirming the charging document. That responsibility stayed
with the INS.150
The issue of whether noncitizen juveniles who were in INS custody
had the right to a prompt probable cause hearing before a neutral judge
was an issue in litigation that began in the Ninth Circuit in the 1980s.151 In
Flores by Galvez-Maldonado v. Meese,152 a panel of the Ninth Circuit reversed
a district court judge’s order granting such hearings.153 The panel
concluded that Gerstein did not apply to deportation proceedings, and that
the Gerstein Court itself stressed that its holding was not readily
transferrable to civil proceedings. 154 The panel also followed the dicta in
Abel, writing that although “professing not to reach the issue of whether
an INS arrest warrant was invalid because it failed to comply with the
fourth amendment's requirements for warrants, the Court nonetheless
devoted five pages to rejecting petitioner’s claim.”155 An en banc panel of
the Ninth Circuit disagreed, finding that the children’s fundamental
See id. at 689 (discussing special inquiry officers).
See 8 C.F.R. § 239.1 (2017) (describing the power of notice to appear). Nor were judges
given authority to affirm probable cause when the Department of Homeland Security was
created in 2002; rather, the authority to issue NTAs and confirm that the charges contained
therein stayed within DHS. See also Final Rule, Authority of the Secretary of Homeland Security;
Delegations of Authority; Immigration Laws, 68 Fed. Reg. 44, 10922, 10924 (Mar. 6, 2003)
(showing within the Department of Homeland Security Act, Congress finally separated the
immigration enforcement functions from the adjudication functions); Department of
Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107–296, 116 Stat. 2135 (Nov. 25, 2002) (depicting
what had been INS now became ICE (responsible for detention and deportation), the
Citizenship and Immigration Services (responsible for processing affirmative applications),
and the Customs and Border Protection (responsible for border patrol)). The Department of
Homeland Security Act also created the Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services and
the Bureau of Border Security and eliminating the INS. Id. The judges and Board of
Immigration Appeals, within the Executive Office for Immigration Review, remained in the
Department of Justice. Id. at 2273–74.
151
See Flores by Galvez-Maldonado v. Meese, 913 F.2d 1315, 1337 (9th Cir. 1990)
(discussing the necessity of detention versus the protection of alien minors), vacated and
superseded en banc 942 F.2d 1352 (9th Cir. 1991), rev’d sub nom. Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292
(1993), remanded to 992 F.2d 243 (9th Cir. 1993).
152
See id. (reasoning that the necessity of detention warranted the denial of such hearings).
153
Id. at 1335–37.
154
See id. at 1336 (citing Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 125 n.27). The Court remanded to the district
court to determine whether such a hearing was appropriate under the Mathews v. Eldridge
balancing test. Id. See also id. at 1337 (citing Mathews, 424 U.S. at 334–35).
155
Id. at 1337 (citing Abel, 362 U.S. at 233). See also Spinella v. Esperdy, 188 F. Supp. 535,
540–41 (S.D.N.Y. 1960) (“While the Supreme Court declined to pass upon a similar argument
in Abel, . . . some pertinent observations there were nonetheless made . . . the court did refer
to its frequent upholding of administrative deportation proceedings shown to have
commenced by arrests made pursuant to such warrants.”).
149
150
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liberty interest required that “the decision to detain be made only in
conjunction with a neutral and detached determination of necessity.” 156
The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit in 1993, in the case
entitled Reno v. Flores.157 The Court found that there was no fundamental
liberty interest at stake because the case dealt with INS custody of
children, who are “always in some form of custody.” 158 Thus, “shackles,
chains, or barred cells” were not at issue, as would be the case in adult
immigration detention.159 The Court dedicated very little of its decision
to the procedural due process claim that the children should have their
detention promptly reviewed for probable cause by a neutral judge.160
Rather, the Court found that the juveniles were given ample procedures
under the regulations.161 Nowhere in the majority opinion is Gerstein even
mentioned.162 Because the Flores Court took great pains to ensure that it
was not deciding about “shackles, chains, or barred cells,” the issue of
whether adults in immigration detention can seek a Gerstein-style hearing
was not resolved.163 Also, as Michael Kagan has noted, because the Court
was ruling on a facial challenge to the regulation, it did not have to
consider what would amount to “excessive delay” in holding a hearing.164
Flores by Galvez-Maldonado v. Meese, 942 F.2d 1352, 1364 (9th Cir. 1991).
See 507 U.S. 292, 315 (1993) (reversing the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Flores).
158
Id. at 302 (internal citations and quotations omitted).
159
Id.
160
See id. at 300 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (discussing the issue of prompt judicial review,
which the majority opinion glossed over).
161
See id. at 307–09 (outlining the specific procedures available to juveniles under the
regulations).
162
See id. (avoiding Gerstein and the implications stemming therefrom). This is unlike the
panel decision and the en banc decisions, which, between the majority opinions and the
concurring and dissenting opinions, yielded much discussion about the applicability of
Gerstein or whether a prompt probable cause hearing should be afforded to the juveniles
under the Mathews v. Eldridge test. See, e.g., Flores, 913 F.2d at 1335–37 (panel opinion
discussion of applicability of Gerstein). In dissent, Justice Fletcher stated, “the [Gerstein]
Court reasoned that when ‘the stakes are this high,’ a determination by a neutral magistrate
is required. Prosecutorial judgment standing alone is not enough.” Id. at 1348–49. See also
Flores, 942 F.2d at 1364–65 (en banc opinion addressing Gerstein issue); id. at 1367–69 (Tang.
J., concurring) (discussing that under Mathews, not Gerstein, plaintiffs should have a probable
cause hearing with a neutral judge and stating, “[o]ur Constitution has long recognized that
combining the roles of prosecutor and adjudicator in a single entity is a recipe for
fundamentally unfair and erroneous decision making.”); id. at 1374–75 (Rymer, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part) (finding that Gerstein does not apply to civil deportation
hearings, but that “[t]ime limits and impartiality . . . are basic safeguards against arbitrary
action.”).
163
See Kagan, supra note 6, at 151–52 (discussing the Flores Court’s categorization of
juvenile detention as “legal custody” and analogizing it to state orphanages).
164
See Kagan, supra note 6, at 151–52 (noting that the Flores Court sidestepped the excessive
delay issue entirely). In Flores, the INS regulation challenged had been in effect only one
week when the district court issued its judgment; before that, the INS had relied on a 1984
156
157
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Thus, the Supreme Court has never squarely decided whether
immigration detainees have a Fourth Amendment right to a prompt
probable cause hearing before a neutral judge. Perhaps the issue might be
of renewed interest to judges,165 especially in light of the cases discussed
in the next section.166
IV. TAKING ANOTHER LOOK AT PROBABLE CAUSE HEARINGS IN THE
IMMIGRATION SYSTEM
What is different now? Why would courts revisit the question of
whether noncitizens have the right to a prompt review by a neutral judge
of their detention? Besides the political realities of the day—a Trump
presidency with its heightened focus on detention and deportation, 167
Jennifer Chacón answered this in a 2010 article, writing that “[s]everal
legal and demographic trends are converging that create a renewed need
to examine the procedural protections that apply in the context of
immigration law enforcement.” 168
She notes that immigration
enforcement is on the rise, a growing number of noncitizens are
potentially subject to ICE jurisdiction, and local, state, and federal law
enforcement officers are increasingly using immigration law as a means
of achieving criminal law enforcement goals.169 She notes that “[g]rowing
evidence suggests that these gaps between the rights and remedies
available to noncitizens in removal proceedings and those available to
noncitizens in criminal proceedings have encouraged more aggressive
forms of policing in immigrant communities.”170

policy that was codified in the regulation. Flores, 507 U.S. at 295–97, 300. The Court reasoned
that to prevail in such a facial challenge, the children “must establish that no set of
circumstances exists under which the [regulation] would be valid.” Id. at 301 (quoting
United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987)).
165
Cf. Gordon v. Johnson, 300 F.R.D. 31, 42 (D. Mass. 2014) (finding concerns with “the
procedures used to effectuate the requirements of section 1226(a) [governing detention and
bond hearings in immigration court]–specifically the time between detention and a bail
hearing as well as the ability of a detainee to ensure his or her request for a hearing makes
its way to an Immigration official . . . ”).
166
See infra Part III (discussing probable cause hearings in the immigration system).
167
See supra notes 17–22 and accompanying text (examining President Trump’s strong
push to detain and deport aliens, particularly ones who have committed crimes); infra note
261 and accompanying text (describing Trump’s effort to fast-track deportation
proceedings).
168
Chacón, supra note 2, at 1622.
169
See Chacón, supra note 2, at 1622 (describing the current trend in immigration
enforcement).
170
Chacón, supra note 2, at 1622–23.
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Developments in Supreme Court case law could cause courts to take
a second look at this issue.171 Also, the successful ICE detainer litigation,
such as the cases discussed below, has caused courts to show a renewed
interest in the lack of a prompt probable cause hearing when someone is
arrested for deportation. 172
A. Padilla v. Kentucky: Rethinking Deportation as Civil
Courts should take another look at this issue now because in 2010, in
Padilla v. Kentucky, the Supreme Court called into question the
categorization of deportation as civil, thus raising new questions about
whether the Fourth Amendment should apply to deportation
proceedings.173 On its face, Padilla appears to be a simple holding about
defense counsel’s duty to advise noncitizen defendants about deportation
consequences.174 However, to reach that holding, the Court made
significant headway into reclassifying deportation as punishment. 175 For
example, the Court stated that: “deportation is an integral part—indeed,
sometimes the most important part—of the penalty that may be imposed
on noncitizen defendants who plead guilty to specified crimes.”176 The
Court explained this after discussing how “[o]ur law has enmeshed
criminal convictions and the penalty of deportation for nearly a
century,”177 and it is “‘most difficult’ to divorce the penalty from the
conviction in the deportation context.” 178 The Court seemed to waffle
between calling deportation civil or criminal. Repeating the time-honored
passage that deportation is not punishment for a crime, the Court then
171
See id. at 1568–69 (articulating the Supreme Court decision in INS v. Lopez-Mendoza
related to a deportation hearing).
172
See generally Kagan, supra note 6, at 127 (discussing how warrantless arrests are the
norm in Immigration law enforcement and there is not immediate probable cause finding
either).
173
See 559 U.S. 356, 365–66 (2010) (bringing into question deportation and whether it
should be considered civil or criminal in nature); Kanstroom, supra note 14, at 1472
(analyzing deportation, the Padilla case, and the consequences brought about by Padilla on
Fifth, Sixth, and Fourth Amendment protections). See also Peter Markowitz, Deportation is
Different, 13 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1299, 1314–15 (2011) (providing that the Fourth Amendment
should apply to cases of deportation).
174
See 559 U.S. at 374 (quoting McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970)) (“[i]t is our
responsibility under the Constitution to ensure that no criminal defendant—whether a
citizen or not—is left to the ‘mercies of incompetent counsel.’ . . . To satisfy this
responsibility, we now hold that counsel must inform her client whether his plea carries a
risk of deportation.”).
175
See id. at 363–64 (asserting that since deportation could be a criminal punishment, there
has never been more importance of accurate legal advice for those facing deportation).
176
Id. at 364.
177
Id. at 365–66.
178
Id. at 366. (quoting United States v. Russell, 686 F.2d 35, 38 (1982)).
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stated that “deportation is nevertheless intimately related to the criminal
process.”179 The Court ultimately refused to classify deportation as either
civil or criminal.180 Conflating the civil-criminal distinction with the
collateral-direct designation, the Court stated that deportation is
“uniquely difficult to classify as either a direct or collateral consequence
[of a criminal conviction].”181
If one thinks of deportation as “quasi-criminal,” it is easier to
conceptualize a way in which the Fourth Amendment could apply. 182 In
a prior article, I proposed an application of the Sixth Amendment’s
Confrontation Clause,183 applying Padilla to extend certain “hard-floor”
rights available in the criminal justice system. 184 Most significantly, these
rights can attach categorically, as opposed to relying on a case-by-case
analysis (under Mathews v. Eldridge)185 of whether the facts of a given case
require the application of a right.186 I discuss how courts have been willing
to extend other criminal justice rights in the deportation context, 187 such

Padilla, 559 U.S. at 365.
See id. at 365–66 (debating, but not concluding, whether or not deportation is a civil or
a criminal matter).
181
Id. at 357. See also Markowitz, supra note 173, at 1338–39 (analyzing how courts tend to
use the term “collateral consequence” as synonymous with “civil consequence” and that the
Padilla Court conflates these two discussions).
182
See generally Holper, Confronting Cops, supra note 2, at 721 (presenting the idea of
conceptualizing deportation as both a criminal and civil matter).
183
See id. at 693 (arguing that Sixth Amendment confrontation clause protections should
be applied in removal proceedings).
184
See id. (proposing the need for the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause protections
to be applied to removal proceedings). See also, e.g., id. at 1499–1500 (citing Betts v. Brady,
316 U.S. 455 (1942)) (discussing cases leading up to Gideon’s recognition of a right to counsel
in criminal cases and stating, “[i]t would seem to be clearly wrong now to categorize all
forms of deportation as noncriminal, nonpunitive, and collateral, and thus subjected only to
the flexible (and frequently ineffective) due process norms à la Betts”); Markowitz,
Deportation Is Different, supra note 173, at 1488–89 (displaying the difference between the
criminal and civil realms and how applicable rights in the criminal realm act as a hard floor
regardless of specific circumstances).
185
See 424 U.S. 319, 334–35 (1976) (articulating that certain “hard-floor” rights can be
attached categorically instead of relying on a case-by-case analysis).
186
See Holper, Confronting Cops, supra note 2, at 693 (reviewing whether the Sixth
Amendment right of confrontation applies to a civil case rather than a criminal case);
Markowitz, Deportation is Different, supra note 173, at 1338–39 (discussing the difference
between “hard floor” rights in the criminal realm and case-by-case rights in the civil realm,
and advocating for a test that recognizes some deportations as quasi-criminal and therefore
certain hard floor rights should apply).
187
See Holper, Confronting Cops, supra note 2, at 693 (articulating that courts have been
extending rights afforded in criminal justice proceedings to the deportation proceedings).
179
180
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as the rule of lenity, 188 principles against retroactive legislation, 189 a
heightened burden to prove deportability, 190 and (a watered-down
version of) the exclusionary rule. 191 Thus, it is not a far stretch to extend
the Fourth Amendment’s guarantee of a neutral, detached magistrate to
promptly prove the need to detain.192
B. Zadvydas v. Davis: Questioning the Plenary Power Doctrine
It is also necessary to discuss why immigration law’s plenary power,
which causes courts to avoid second-guessing the political branches in
immigration law,193 should not govern a court’s consideration of the
adequacy of the procedures used to determine whether probable cause
exists to hold an immigration detainee. 194 The Supreme Court has found

188
See Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 11 n.8 (2004) (providing that the rule of lenity provides
that if there is ambiguous language in a criminal code then the language will be construed
in favor of the accused); Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan, 333 U.S. 6, 9–10 (1948) (describing the rule
of lenity and its applicability to deportation statutes and trials).
189
See INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 315–51 (2001) (focusing on principles against retroactive
legislation).
190
See Woodby v. INS, 385 U.S. 276, 285 (1966) (explaining that the Court has referred to
the “clear, convincing, and unequivocal” standard of proof adopted by the Woodby Court in
deportation cases as an “intermediate standard”); Brandt Distributing Co. Inc. v. Federal
Insurance Co., 247 F. 3d 822, 824 (8th Cir. 2001) (emphasizing the type of standard of proof
adopted in Woody which is generally used “in civil cases involving allegations of fraud or
some other quasi-criminal wrongdoing by the defendant.”). See also, e.g., Addington v.
Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 424, 432 (1979) (discussing the heightened burden to prove deportability
and holding that in civil commitment cases, due process requires the intermediate standard
of proof and not the criminal “proof beyond reasonable doubt” standard).
191
See, e.g., INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1049–51 (1984) (describing courts
extension of criminal justice rights in the deportation context, including the exclusionary
rule).
192
See, e.g., Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13–14 (1948) (determining that the Fourth
Amendment’s requirement for probable cause should be decided by a neutral and detached
magistrate).
193
See Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 712–13 (1893) (discussing how
allowing or excluding immigrates affects international relations and this process should be
overseen by political departments and regulated by executive departments); Ekiu v. United
States, 142 U.S. 651, 659 (1892) (stating that is a well-known and accepted adage that
sovereign territories, such as the United States, has the power to forbid immigrants to come
into their land); Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 603–04, 606 (1889) (reasoning
that if the United States could not exclude noncitizens, “it would be to that extent subject to
the control of another power” because it could not defend itself against “vast hordes
of . . . people crowding in upon us”); United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S.
537, 544 (1950) (“[w]hatever the procedure authorized by Congress is, it is due process as far
as an alien denied entry is concerned”).
194
See Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 760 (discussing the probable cause requirement for
holding an immigration detainee).
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that detention is a necessary part of the removal process;195 thus, it would
follow that if the political branches’ decisions in the deportation process
are not subject to second-guessing by courts, neither should their
detention decisions be scrutinized by the judiciary.196 However, as David
Cole has noted, the Supreme Court has been careful to apply traditional
Due Process analysis, even in the face of the plenary power, when
considering questions of detention. 197
In 2001, in Zadvydas v. Davis, the Court considered the
constitutionality of a statute that the INS interpreted to permit indefinite
detention of noncitizens who were ordered removed, but remained
indefinitely detained because they were either stateless or their
governments refused to repatriate them.198 The Court resolved the
constitutional issue by avoiding it, instead interpreting the post-order
custody review statute as not permitting detention beyond six months. 199
However, the Court’s rhetoric about the constitutionality of immigration
detention suggested that it would require the government to provide
special justification for its immigration detention decisions, as it had
required of the government in other civil detention contexts. 200 Most
importantly, the Court stated that the plenary power is “subject to
important constitutional limitations.” 201 Michael Kagan acknowledges
that Zadvydas concerned immigration detention at the “back end” (when
the noncitizen had been detained for a while), instead of questioning the
195
See Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 538 (1952) (articulating the necessity for detention
to be a part of the deportation process); Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 235 (1896)
(agreeing that there is a necessity for detention within the deportation process).
196
See Carlson, 342 U.S. at 534 (reasoning that even lawful permanent residents “remain
subject to the plenary power of Congress to expel them under the sovereign right to
determine what noncitizens shall be permitted to remain within our borders”); id. at 538
(“[d]etention is necessarily a part of this deportation procedure. Otherwise aliens arrested
for deportation would have opportunities to hurt the United States during the pendency of
deportation proceedings.”).
197
See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 695 (“[t]hat [plenary] power is subject to important
constitutional limitations.”). See also David Cole, In Aid of Removal: Due Process Limits on
Immigration Detention, 51 EMORY L.J. 1003, 1038 (2002) (arguing that defenders of unchecked
detention as part of the deportation process “have confused the power to deport with the
power to detain”); id. at 1016 (“at the very height of deference to plenary immigration power,
the Court in Wong Wing applied to immigration detention the same principle that it has
subsequently applied in other civil detention cases: an absolute prohibition of the use of civil
detention for punitive ends” (citing Wong Wing, 163 U.S. at 228)).
198
See id. at 684.
199
See id. at 699–701 (interpreting the post-order custody review statute).
200
See Cole, supra note 197, at 1017–21 (suggesting that the Court would require the
government to provide special justification for its immigration detention decisions);
Margaret Taylor, Demore v. Kim: Judicial Deference to Congressional Folly 364, in IMMIGRATION
STORIES (Foundation Press 2005).
201
Taylor, supra note 200, at 695.
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initial decision to detain. 202 However, the Court’s decision in Zadvydas
marks a turning point in the doctrine, where the Court was willing to
recognize that there is something different about immigration detention
that causes the plenary power to lose its force where it otherwise might
apply to block courts’ considerations of immigration questions. 203
At first glance, the Court’s next immigration detention decision after
Zadvydas, its 2003 decision in Demore v. Kim,204 appears to foreclose a Due
Process challenge to the lack of a prompt probable cause hearing. 205 In
Demore, the Court considered a Due Process challenge to mandatory
detention without an individualized hearing on flight risk and
dangerousness.206 Mr. Kim was a LPR who was deportable for two
“crimes involving moral turpitude,” which under the mandatory
detention statute meant that an immigration judge could not consider his
bond request.207 The Court held that these procedures did not violate Due
Process because they applied to a narrow group of those Congress deemed
most dangerous208—those deportable for certain types of crimes,
including aggravated felonies209—and detention was brief.210
See Kagan, supra note 6, at 129–30.
See id. at 142–44 (articulating that the decision in Zadvydas was a turning point in
immigration decisions, ruling that there is something different about immigration detention
making the plenary authority lose its power when it might otherwise apply). See also
Immigrants Rights Clinic, New York University, supra note 68, at 418–19, 419 n. 104 (noting
Congress’s plenary power over aliens, but addressing “whether Congress has chosen a
constitutionally permissible means of implementing that power” by engaging in due process
review (citing INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 940–41 (1983))).
204
See 538 U.S. 510, 531 (2003) (reviewing issues regarding immigration detention for the
first time after Zadvydas).
205
See id. at 526–27, 531 (illustrating that instead the Due Process challenge to prompt bond
hearing is quashed).
206
See id. at 514 (questioning the constitutionality of 28 U.S.C. § 2241 under the Due Process
Clause).
207
See id. at 513, 513 n.1 (defining crimes that involve “moral turpitude”).
208
See id. at 518–21 (relying on Congressional reports that allowed for legislative
presumption of dangerousness and flight risk). See also id. at 524–25 (holding that the Due
Process clause was not violated because the statute applied to a select group of dangerous
individuals).
209
Mandatory detention applies to noncitizens deportable for firearms, aggravated
felonies, crimes involving moral turpitude, terrorism or security reasons, and noncitizens
who are inadmissible for any criminal reasons. See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c). Although the term
“aggravated felony” sounds sinister, in reality the term is quite all-encompassing, having
been described as “colossus” after “a series of amendments have added crime after crime to
the list.” Id. See also Legomsky, Asymmetric Norms, supra note 1, at 484; Peter Markowitz,
Straddling the Civil-Criminal Divide: A Bifurcated Approach to Understanding the Nature of
Removal Proceedings, 43 HARV. C.R-C.L. REV. 289, 340 (2008) (“[t]he definition of aggravated
felony has been expanded to sweep so broadly that now a crime does not need to be either
aggravated or a felony to fall within the statutory definition of ‘aggravated felony.’”).
210
Writing to uphold mandatory detention in Demore, Justice Rehnquist cited statistics that
led the Court to believe that a typical removal hearing where the person is in detention “lasts
202
203
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However, the mandatory detention statute in Demore narrowly
withstood a Due Process challenge,211 and that was only because the fifth
vote, Justice Kennedy, believed that there was in fact an individualized
review by an immigration judge of the legality of the detention. 212 Mr.
Kim could have asked an immigration judge to review whether he was
properly included in the mandatory detention statute. 213 An immigration
judge, in what is referred to as a Joseph hearing (named after the Board’s
decision authorizing such hearing), 214 can review whether a detainee has

roughly a month and a half in the vast majority of cases in which it is invoked, and about
five months in the minority of cases in which the alien chooses to appeal.” See Demore, 538
U.S. at 530. The Department of Justice recently wrote a letter to the Court explaining that
these statistics were incorrect; mandatory detention for detainees who appeal their cases
actually lasted twelve months in the average case at the time the government presented these
statistics. Id. See also Letter from Ian Heath Gershengorn, Acting Solicitor General, U.S. Dep’t
of Justice, to the Honorable Scott Harris, Clerk, Supreme Court of the United States (Aug. 26,
2016)
http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/Demore.pdf
[https://perma.cc/S98W-45AH].
211
Scholars have been critical of the Court’s decision in Demore. See, e.g., David Cole, Out
of the Shadows: Preventive Detention, Suspected Terrorists, and War, 97 CAL. L. REV. 693, 717
(2009) ( “[t]he Court’s reasoning in [Demore v. Kim] is flawed, as it proffers no good reason
for discarding the requirement of individualized need before subjecting a human being to
preventive detention.”). See also Taylor, supra note 200, at 345 (describing the case in terms
of legal realism, since it was decided in a post-September 11th world, which provides a
striking contrast to Zadvydas, which was decided before September 11, 2001).
212
See Demore, 538 U.S. at 531–33 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citing Matter of Joseph, 22 I. &
N. Dec. 799 (BIA 1999)) (describing procedures, laid out in the Board’s decision in Matter of
Joseph, whereby a mandatory detainee can seek review by an immigration judge about
whether he is properly included in a mandatory detention category, and stating that “due
process requires individualized procedures to ensure there is at least some merit to the
[INS]’s charge and, therefore, sufficient justification to detain a lawful permanent resident
alien pending a more formal hearing”). See also Demore, 538 U.S. at 515 n.3 (“[b]ecause
respondent conceded that he was deportable because of a conviction that triggers § 1226(c)
and thus sought no Joseph hearing, we have no occasion to review the adequacy of Joseph
hearings generally in screening out those who are improperly detained pursuant to
§ 1226(c).”). Justice Kennedy also focused on the short length of detention, noting that “a
lawful permanent resident alien such as respondent could be entitled to an individualized
determination as to his risk of flight and dangerousness if the continued detention became
unreasonable or unjustified.” Demore, 538 U.S. at 532 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citing
Zadyvdas, 533 U.S. at 684–86); Cole, Preventive Detention, supra note 224, at 717 (describing
Demore as an outlier for upholding preventive detention without the usual showing
necessary, but that “even there the crucial fifth vote stressed the importance of some kind of
individualized determination”).
213
See Demore, 538 U.S. at 531 (articulating that Mr. Kim had the option to ask the
immigration judge to review that appropriateness of being included in the mandatory
detention statute).
214
See Matter of Joseph, 22 I. & N. Dec. 799, 809 (BIA 1999) (ruling in a “Joseph” hearing,
which is named after the Board’s decision authorizing the decision to be made).
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been properly charged as an aggravated felon, and thus subject to
mandatory detention.215
Because the Demore Court assumed that Mr. Kim had foregone the
right to ask for a Joseph hearing, the Court did not consider any
constitutional challenges to such a hearing.216 Following Demore, courts
and scholars have criticized these hearings.217 Namely, the detainee must
request it (as opposed to it being automatically provided, unlike a
probable cause hearing);218 there is no timeline by which it must happen
(again, unlike the probable cause hearing, which must occur within fortyeight hours for criminal detention and seventy-two hours for civil
detention);219 and there is an incredibly high standard of proof, requiring
the detainee to bear the burden of proving that DHS is “substantially
unlikely to prevail” on their ground of deportability.220

215
See id. at 800 (interpreting that the immigration judge has the discretion to review
whether or not the detainee has been appropriately charged as an aggravated felon,
subjecting that detainee to mandatory detention).
216
See Demore, 538 U.S. at 514 (ruling that Mr. Kim did not request a “Joseph hearing”, and
therefore the Court did not consider any constitutional challenges to that type of hearing).
217
See, e.g., Kagan, supra note 6, at 160 (discussing three limits on the impact of such Joseph
hearings); Tijani v. Willis, 430 F.3d 1241, 1246 (9th Cir. 2005) (Tashima, J., concurring)
(articulating that the Joseph standard places minimal risk on the governments broad
shoulders).
218
See Kagan, supra note 6, at 160 (articulating that a detained respondent for a Joseph
hearing must request the hearing); Flores, 942 F.2d at 1368 n.3 (Tang, J., concurring)
(“[f]reedom from governmental restraint is not a right reserved exclusively for those
schooled in the intricacies of INS regulations”).
219
See Kagan, supra note 6, at 165–66 (describing how many states limit emergency civil
commitment without a hearing or neutral review to seventy-two hours or less).
220
See Tijani, 430 F.3d at 1246 (Tashima, J., concurring) (“Joseph standard is not just
unconstitutional, it is egregiously so. The standard not only places the burden on the
defendant to prove that he should not be physically detained, it makes that burden all but
insurmountable.”). See also Kagan, supra note 6, at 160 (discussing the three significant
limitations on the impact of a Joseph hearing); Noferi, supra note 111, at 68 (critiquing
procedures available in Joseph hearings); Faiza W. Sayed, Challenging Detention: Why
Immigrant Detainees Receive Less Process Than "Enemy Combatants" and Why They Deserve More,
111 COLUM. L. REV. 1833, 1872 (2011) (comparing procedures for immigration detainees,
which are less protective than those used for Guantanamo detainees’ cases, and arguing that
the government should bear the burden of proof at a Joseph hearing); Shalini Bargava,
Detaining Due Process: The Need for Procedural Reform in “Joseph” Hearings After Demore v.
Kim, 31 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. 51, 54–55 (2006) (arguing that the burden of proof in Joseph
hearings violates Due Process).
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C. The ICE Detainer Litigation and Arizona v. United States: Renewed
Interest in the Lack of a Prompt Probable Cause Hearing
The successful ICE detainer litigation, fueled by the scholarship of my
co-panelist Christopher Lasch,221 has caused courts across the United
States to find Fourth Amendment violations when counties continued to
hold a noncitizen pursuant to an ICE detainer. 222 The ICE detainer is a
request to state or local authorities to “[m]aintain custody” of a person for
an additional forty-eight hours, plus weekends and holidays, “beyond the
time when the person would have otherwise been released” from the state
or local custody.223 When local jails honored ICE’s request and refused to
release a noncitizen until ICE came to detain them, the noncitizens sued
the jails, arguing that this continued custody was a new arrest for Fourth
Amendment purposes, yet that it lacked probable cause. 224 Because
noncitizens enjoy the same rights as citizens when charged or held for a
crime,225 courts have responded to the unlawful seizure of a noncitizen by
the criminal justice system’s actors by analyzing their cases under
221
See Lasch, supra note 3, at 174 (writing about the limits that should be upheld on the
executive branch’s power to issue immigration detainers).
222
See ICE Detainers and the Fourth Amendment: What Do Recent Federal Court Decisions
Mean? AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, (Nov. 13, 2014), https://www.aclu.org/
other/backgrounder-ice-detainers-and-fourth-amendment-what-do-recent-federal-courtdecisions-mean (providing Fourth Amendment detention cases).
223
Miranda-Olivares v. Clackamas County, 2014 WL 1414305, at *2 (2014). See also 8 C.F.R.
§ 287.7(d) (discussing temporary detention at the request of the Homeland Security
Department and that it shall not exceed forty-eight hours, not including the weekend and
holidays).
224
See, e.g., Orellana v. Nobles Cty., 230 F.Supp.3d 934, 940 (2017) (holding that the
immigration detainee’s continued confinement after he would have been released on state
charges of driving under the influence, pursuant to ICE detainer, violated his rights under
the Fourth Amendment); Moreno v. Napolitano, 213 F. Supp. 3d 999, 1004, 1007 (2016)
(granting summary judgment to class of individuals targeted by ICE detainers on their claim
that ICE’s practice of issuing detainers without obtaining an arrest warrant was prohibited
by the INA and finding that that the warrantless arrest power of § 1357(a)(2) did not defeat
their claim because “immigration officers make no determination whatsoever that the subject
of a detainer is likely to escape upon release before a warrant can be obtained . . . ”); MirandaOlivares v. Clackamas Cty., No. 3:12–cv–02317, 2014 WL 1414305, at *10 (D. Or. Apr. 11, 2014)
(arguing this was a new arrest for Fourth Amendment purposes); ACLU, ICE Detainers, supra
note 222, at 3–4 (collecting cases where holding a noncitizen under ICE detainer was found
to be a new arrest for Fourth Amendment purposes).
225
See David Cole, Are Foreign Nationals Entitled to the Same Constitutional Protections as
Citizens?, 25 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 367, 370 (2003) (explaining how the rights attaching to
criminal trials, including the right to a public trial, a trial by jury, the assistance of a lawyer,
and the right to confront adverse witnesses, all apply to “the accused” without reference to
a person’s citizenship). See also D. Carolina Núñez, Inside the Border, Outside the Law:
Undocumented Immigrants and the Fourth Amendment, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 85, 89–90 (2011)
(discussing cases and briefs in which courts and litigants assumed Fourth Amendment’s
application to noncitizens).
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traditional Fourth Amendment principles.226 As Michael Kagan has
noted, the ICE detainer cases revealed “immigration law’s looming Fourth
Amendment problem”—the lack of a Gerstein-Riverside probable cause
hearing when immigration authorities arrest noncitizens for
deportation.227
Similarly, in 2012, in Arizona v. United States,228 the Supreme Court
reaffirmed the idea that civil immigration arrests, just like criminal arrests,
must comply with the Fourth Amendment.229 This case considered
whether Arizona’s controversial immigration law was preempted by
federal law.230 The Court discussed section 2(B) of the law, which required
Arizona officers to make a “reasonable attempt . . . to determine the
immigration status” of any person they stop, detain, or arrest on some
other legitimate basis if “reasonable suspicion exists that the person is an
alien and is unlawfully present in the United States.” 231 The law also
provided that “[a]ny person who is arrested shall have the person’s
immigration status determined before the person is released.”232 While
the Court found that other provisions of Arizona’s law were preempted
by federal law,233 section 2(B) was not, because nothing in federal law

See ACLU, ICE Detainers, supra note 222 (analyzing unlawful seizure of a noncitizen
under a traditional Fourth Amendment principle).
227
See generally Kagan, supra note 6, at 158 (discussing immigration law’s lack of a GersteinRiverside probable cause hearing).
228
See Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 446 (2012) (affirming that civil immigration
arrests must comply with the Fourth Amendment).
229
See id. at 413 (noting that “detaining individuals solely to verify their immigration status
would raise constitutional concerns” and citing Fourth Amendment cases).
230
See id. at 399 (quoting Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13–1509(A)) (“Section 3 of the Arizona Law
(S.B. 1070) creat[ed] a new state misdemeanor [that] forbids the ‘willful failure to complete
or carry an alien registration document in violation of 8 United States Code § 1304(e) or
1306(a).’”); id. at 400–02 (presenting that the Court held that § 3 added a state-law penalty for
conduct proscribed by federal law and thus was preempted by federal law). See also id. at
402 (quoting Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13–2928(C)) (displaying that the Court also considered
§ 5(C), which made it a state misdemeanor for “[a]n unauthorized alien to knowingly apply
for work, solicit work in a public place or perform work as an employee or independent
contractor” in Arizona.); id. at 406 (explaining how the Court held that § 5(C) was preempted
because the Arizona law would interfere with the careful balance struck by Congress with
respect to unauthorized employment of aliens.); id. at 406 (quoting ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 13–3883(A)(5)) (demonstrating that the third provision the Court considered was Section 6
of S.B. 1070, which provided that a state officer, “without a warrant, may arrest a person if
the officer has probable cause to believe . . . [the person] has committed any public offense
that makes [him] removable from the United States.”); id. at 407–10 (conveying that the Court
held that § 6 was preempted by federal law, since the removal process is entrusted to the
federal government and this statute would create an obstacle to federal enforcement efforts).
231
Id. at 409–10.
232
Id. at 413–14.
233
See id. at 399–410 (outlining the Arizona laws that were preempted by federal law).
226
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prohibited states from sharing information with ICE.234 When challengers
suggested that Arizona officials would delay the release of individuals
pending information from ICE, the Court stated, citing Fourth
Amendment cases, that such holds would be illegal. 235 The Court also
stated, “it is not a crime for a removable alien to remain present in the
United States . . . [so] the police [cannot] stop someone based on nothing
more than possible removability [and] the usual predicate for an arrest is
absent.”236 Arizona thus provides helpful, relatively recent, dicta from the
Supreme Court that civil immigration arrests must comply with the
Fourth Amendment.237
The detainer cases look more like a classic Fourth Amendment case,
because it was criminal justice system actors detaining persons (or in the
case of Arizona, a hypothetical situation where a state officer holds a
detainee too long). 238 However, the lesson is the same—it is not
permissible, under the Fourth Amendment, to take away a person’s liberty
without a prompt probable cause hearing by a neutral decisionmaker. 239
It should not matter who is taking away the liberty—a county that has just
finished detaining him pursuant to a criminal charge, or ICE.240 In both
cases, the deprivation of liberty happens while ICE takes its own sweet
time building a case against the detainee without having to justify this to
a neutral judge.241 In County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, the Supreme Court
wrote that “delays for the purpose of gathering additional evidence to
justify the arrest, a delay motivated by ill will against the arrested
individual, or delay for delay’s sake” are all unreasonable delays—and
those were “unreasonable delays” even if the probable cause hearing
happened within forty-eight hours.242

See id. at 411–13 (reasoning that federal law actually encouraged information-sharing
between state and federal officials).
235
See Arizona, 567 U.S. at 413–14 (citing Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 333 (2009)
(quoting Arizona law dealing with the determination of a person’s immigration status)).
236
Id. at 407.
237
See id. at 446 (outlining a reasonable attempt to investigate immigration status with
Fourth Amendment compliance).
238
See id. at 333 (demonstrating hypothetical situation of detainee being held too long).
239
See U.S. CONST. amend. IV (prohibiting unreasonable searches and seizures).
240
Compare U.S. CONST. amend. IV (banning unreasonable searches and seizures) with 8
C.F.R. § 287.7 (2017) (outlining who has the authority to issue detainers).
241
See Morales v. Chadbourne, 793 F.3d 208, 218 (1st Cir. 2015) (showing Bivens action
against ICE officials for issuing a detainer against a U.S. citizen, reasoning that ICE officials
are welcome to go about their work determining whether there is reasonable suspicion that
someone has violated the immigration laws, but they just must let the person out of jail while
they undertake such investigation).
242
500 U.S. 44, 56 (1991).
234
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It appears that an opening is available in the doctrine for immigration
detainees to request prompt probable cause hearings by a neutral judge. 243
In the next section, I discuss why such probable cause hearings should
only happen in post-entry social control deportations. 244
V. A PROMPT PROBABLE CAUSE HEARING FOR POST-ENTRY SOCIAL
CONTROL DEPORTATIONS
Before explaining why prompt probable cause hearings should only
occur in post-entry social control cases, it is first helpful to define that
term.245 We are indebted to Daniel Kanstroom for the concept of “postentry social control” deportation, which encompasses deportation of
noncitizens who have been admitted to the United States and who are
deportable due to criminal or political conduct. 246 For them, Kanstroom
argues, deportation essentially functions as punishment because it
regulates their behavior and thus exercises continual control over them,
as does the criminal law.247 Thus, the constitutional protections of a
Kanstroom
criminal trial should apply in these proceedings.248
distinguishes “post-entry social control” deportations from “extended
border control” deportations,249 where the noncitizen has not been
admitted to the United States or has been admitted, yet violates the rules
that govern his temporary residence.250 These proceedings are essentially
contractual and thus it is more appropriate to think of them as civil and
non-punitive.251

243
Compare Fed. R. Crim. P. 5.1(e) (explaining the procedure of a probable cause hearing
in a criminal case) with Part V.A (providing a collection of cases that have held that this rule
does not apply to deportation).
244
See infra Part V (discussing prompt probable cause hearings for post-entry social control
deportations).
245
See KANSTROOM, DEPORTATION NATION, supra note 11, at 4–6 (describing post-entry
social control as laws that proscribe criminal and political conduct as grounds for
deportation).
246
See Kanstroom, Fifth-and-a-Half Amendment, supra note 14, at 1465 and accompanying
text (presenting more information defining post-entry social control).
247
See Kanstroom, Deportation, Social Control, supra note 11, at 1898 (expounding upon the
similarities between immigration removal and criminal law).
248
See Kanstroom, Fifth-and-a-Half Amendment, supra note 14, at 1465, 1499–1500
(discussing how due process should extend to aliens).
249
See KANSTROOM, DEPORTATION NATION, supra note 11, at 6 (distinguishing between
post-entry social control and extended border control).
250
See KANSTROOM, DEPORTATION NATION, supra note 11, at 6 (describing the differences
between post-entry social control and extended border control).
251
See Kanstroom, Deportation, Social Control, supra note 11, at 1907 (presenting the
proceedings as more civil and contractual in nature).
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A. Limiting the Remedy to Post-Entry Social Control Deportations
Why should probable cause hearings only happen in post-entry social
control cases? First, the rationale that keeps deportation proceedings
squarely in the “civil,” as opposed to “criminal,” box, and thus failing to
incorporate procedural protections such as the Fourth Amendment’s right
to a prompt probable cause hearing by a neutral judge, does not hold up
as well in the context of post-entry social control deportations. 252
Following the rationale in Padilla, it is easier to conceptualize deportation
for a crime as punishment and thus deserving of at least the “quasi-right”
to a Fourth Amendment probable cause hearing.253
In contrast, a proposal that encompasses extended border control
deportations carries much more legal baggage. 254 Although the Court’s
statements in Abel were dicta, they nonetheless proved persuasive to some
courts afterwards.255 Also, the Supreme Court in its 1993 Reno v. Flores256
decision rejected an argument that, under a Due Process analysis, a class
of unaccompanied minor noncitizens should be entitled to prompt review
of their custody by a neutral immigration judge.257 While Michael Kagan
offered reasons for why Flores would not foreclose a future argument
(especially on behalf of an adult immigration detainee), 258 I query whether
See supra Part IV.A (discussing Padilla v. Kentucky).
See supra Part IV.A.
254
See supra Part III (looking at court challenges to immigration detainee’s lack of a prompt
probable cause hearing).
255
See, e.g., Flores by Galvez-Maldonado v. Meese, 913 F.2d 1315, 1337 (9th Cir. 1990),
superseded by Flores v. Reno, 942 F.2d 1352 (9th Cir. 1990) (en banc) (reversed by Reno v.
Flores, 507 U.S. 292 (1993) (“[o]ur holding is in keeping with the Supreme Court’s forceful
dicta in Abel . . . though professing not to reach the issue of whether an INS arrest warrant
was invalid because it failed to comply with the fourth amendment’s requirements for
warrants, the Court nonetheless devoted five pages to rejecting petitioner’s claim.”); Spinella
v. Esperdy, 188 F. Supp. 535, 540–41 (S.D.N.Y. 1960) (“[w]hile the Supreme Court declined
to pass upon a similar argument in Abel, . . . some pertinent observations there were
nonetheless made . . . the court did refer to its frequent upholding of administrative
deportation proceedings shown to have commenced by arrests made pursuant to such
warrants.”).
256
507 U.S. 292 (1993).
257
See id. at 308–09 (displaying that lower courts had rejected similar arguments). See, e.g.,
Salgado v. Scannel, 561 F.2d 1211, 1212 (5th Cir. 1977) (explaining why the motion for
suppression was not granted). See also United States v. Noel, 231 F.3d 833, 837 (11th Cir. 2000)
(per curiam) (conveying that Criminal Procedure Rule 5(a) does not apply to deportation);
United States v. Cepeda-Luna, 989 F.2d 353, 358 (9th Cir. 1993) (demonstrating that Criminal
Procedure Rule 5(a) does not apply to deportation); United States v. Valente, 155 F. Supp.
577, 579 (D. Mass. 1957) (Aldrich, J.) (stating Criminal Procedure Rule 5(a) does not apply to
deportation).
258
See Kagan, supra note 6, at 151–52 (discussing how Kagan writes that because the Court
was ruling on a facial challenge, it did not have to consider what would amount to “excessive
delay” in holding a hearing). See also Kagan, Immigration Law’s Looming Fourth Amendment
252
253
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trying to make the case for probable cause hearings for the extended
border control cases is dragging down the vindication of rights by those
whose cases more closely resemble punishment for a crime, and thus have
a stronger claim to more procedural protections in their deportation
hearings.259
A second reason for not granting probable cause hearings to extended
border control detainees is strategic. 260 Many of the extended border
control deportations involve entrants without inspection.261 In their cases,
ICE first carries the burden of proof, which requires them to prove by clear
and convincing evidence that the person in these proceedings is an
“alien.”262 The person in removal proceedings has a right to remain silent
when questioned about alienage.263 Let us say that, when ICE officers
arrested this person, they committed an egregious violation of his Fourth
Amendment rights (by, for example, coercing him to sign a statement that
he was from Mexico). According to the Supreme Court's Lopez-Mendoza
decision, the earlier statements can be suppressed in immigration court
because of the egregious nature of the Fourth Amendment violation. 264
Problem, supra note 6, at 151–52 (quoting Flores, 507 U.S. at 302–03) (exemplifying that
because Flores dealt with a child, who is always in some form of custody, and specifically did
not deal with “shackles, chains, or barred cells,” its holding would not extend to adults in
immigration detention).
259
See supra Part IV.A (analyzing Padilla v. Kentucky).
260
See Noel, 231 F.3d at 836 (expanding upon the list of reasons that detainees are not
granted prompt probable cause hearings).
261
See KANSTROOM, DEPORTATION NATION, supra note 11, at 5 (describing reasons for
extended border control deportations); Jose Magaña-Salgado, Fair Treatment Denied: The
Trump Administration’s Troubling Attempt to Expand “Fast-Track” Deportations, 5 (2017),
https://www.ilrc.org/report-expedited-removal-expansion
[https://perma.cc/T3ECEXMD] (reporting the Center for Migration Studies Data that projects that the
undocumented population in 2017 is 11,100,000, and of these, 1,025,289 entered in the past
two years, with 355,167 entering without inspection).
262
See 8 C.F.R. § 1240.8(c) (2012) (outlining the establishment of the alienage of the
respondent); Matter of Guevara, 20 I. & N. Dec. 238, 239–40 (BIA 1990) (showing the Board
of Immigration Appeals has held that although judges can draw an adverse inference from
silence, this does not meet the government’s burden of proving alienage by clear and
convincing evidence).
263
See Daniel Kanstroom, Hello Darkness: Involuntary Testimony and Silence as Evidence in
Deportation Proceedings, 4 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 599, 602 (1990) (arguing that respondents in
deportation proceedings cannot be compelled to testify and that this silence cannot support
an order of deportation). See also id. at 603 (“[t]here is no doubt that the privilege [against
self-incrimination] may be asserted in this context, where the testimony sought might result
in criminal prosecution in addition to deportation.”); id. at 626–29 (chronicling the legislative
history behind the requirement that the government first prove alienage in a deportation
case).
264
See INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1050–51 (1984) (holding that, while the
exclusionary rule is available in such proceedings, it is only available where there has been
an egregious violation of the Fourth Amendment); Navia-Duran v. INS, 568 F.2d 803, 807
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However, if he later admits at a removal hearing that he is a citizen of
Mexico, ICE can easily meet its burden of proof. 265 Should entrants
without inspection have prompt probable cause hearings, especially
before they have an opportunity to obtain counsel who could raise these
Fourth Amendment arguments to suppress the prior statements and
counsel them on their right to remain silent, they might promptly admit
to alienage during the probable cause hearing. 266 These admissions would
foreclose any opportunity to raise suppression arguments and terminate
proceedings, since the noncitizen’s statements during the probable cause
hearing would be independent evidence of alienage. 267
Unlike the evidentiary issues in an extended border control case, postentry social control deportations, such as Carlos’ deportation, normally
turn on evidence of a criminal conviction. 268 The statute only permits
(1st Cir. 1977) (suppressing noncitizen’s confession of alienage when confession was coerced
by INS agent). See also Yanez-Marquez v. Lynch, 789 F.3d 434, 459–60 (4th Cir. 2015)
(surveying case law applying Lopez-Mendoza exceptions).
265
See In re Guevara, 20 I. & N. Dec. 238, 241–42 (BIA 1990) (collecting case law to show
silence and citizenship does not avert removal).
266
See Chacón, supra note 2, at 1629–30 (“[w]hen a Fourth Amendment violation occurs
during a search or seizure, or when a due process violation occurs during the government’s
interrogation of a noncitizen, unrepresented immigrants are unlikely to be able to adequately
address the complex legal issues that a suppression motion requires.”).
267
See Chacón, supra note 2, at 1568 (showing that it is possible to advocate for regulation
that separates probable cause hearing records from the removal record, which would mirror
the regulation governing the record in bond hearings); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19(d) (2013)
(“[c]onsideration by the Immigration Judge of an application or request of a respondent
regarding custody shall be separate and apart from, and shall form no part of, any
deportation or removal hearing or proceedings”). See also Immigration Court Practice
Manual § 9.3(a) (“[b]ond proceedings are separate from removal proceedings”); 8 C.F.R.
§ 1240.7(a) (2013) (allowing the receipt into evidence of an “oral or written statement” made
by the respondent or another person during “any investigation, examination, hearing, or
trial”). The Immigration Judge Benchbook reconciles these regulations by advising
immigration judges that it is permissible to use such prior statements made in a bond
proceeding so long as “the evidence is reintroduced and received in the deportation or
removal hearing.” Id. See also Immigration Judge Benchbook, Evidence, p. 3, para 3a-3b;
Joseph v. Holder, 600 F.3d 1235, 1240–41 (9th Cir. 2010) (demonstrating that the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals, however, did not permit an immigration judge to use her notes from a
bond hearing in the removal hearing because of 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19(d) precluded any evidence
from a bond hearing to be used in a removal hearing); id. at 1241 (discussing how the court
did not need to resolve the meaning of 8 C.F.R. § 1240.7(a) because the judge did not rely on
prior written statements and, because no transcript existed of the bond hearing, she did not
rely on prior oral statements); In re Adeniji, 22 I. & N. Dec. 1102, 1126 (BIA 1999) (Rosenberg,
Board Member, dissenting) (“[t]he underlying purpose of [8 C.F.R. § 1003.19(d)] is not to
limit the information an immigration judge may consider in redetermining bond, but to
ensure that evidence presented in far more informal bond hearing does not taint the ultimate
adjudication of the charges of removability.”).
268
For the moment, I leave out a more fulsome discussion of the type of evidence that
would cause DHS to charge a noncitizen with deportability for political activity, which
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certain documents to prove the existence of a conviction—namely,
certified conviction records.269 Thus, requiring the government to act
quickly to get these records might prove overly difficult if DHS continued
to pursue as many criminal deportations as it plans to do under the Trump
administration (or as it was doing previously). 270 The right to a prompt
probable cause hearing would trigger each time DHS charged a criminal
or political ground of deportability. 271 To limit the number of probable
cause hearings in which DHS must quickly justify its detention decisions
by providing criminal records, DHS would likely respond by charging a
criminal or political ground of deportability only when necessary—i.e., in
LPRs’ cases.272 Typically, the deportation of LPRs is purely for post-entry
conduct.273 In contrast, others such as noncitizens who have overstayed

Kanstroom also has classified as part of the category of post-entry social control deportations.
See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(4)(A) (2012) (proscribing deportation for “any activity a purpose
of which is the opposition to, or control or overthrow of, the government by force, violence,
or other means”). See also KANSTROOM, DEPORTATION NATION, supra note 11, at 6 (describing
post-entry social control deportations as including deportation for crime and political
activity). I am limiting my discussion to deportation for a crime, since my own observations
from fourteen years of representing immigration detainees and conducting intake interviews
with immigration detainees has led me to believe that the criminal grounds of deportation
are more frequently charged; supra Part II (comparing criminal justice rights to immigration
rights).
269
See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(3)(B) (2012) (outlining requirements for proof of convictions); 8
C.F.R. § 1003.41 (2013) (presenting which documents are admissible evidence, such as
records of judgments and criminal convictions, pleas, verdicts, and docket entries).
270
See Ye Hee Lee, supra note 20 (stating that President Trump expressed a desire to target
“criminal aliens” for deportation); id. (taking advantage of fuzzy math, President Trump
claimed that there were 2 million undocumented noncitizens with criminal convictions,
when in fact there are 1.9 million noncitizens deportable for crime—many are LPRs or
otherwise legally here—and only 820,000 (about 43% of that 1.9 million “criminal aliens”)
are undocumented). See also Casselman, supra note 20 (showing this puts President Trump
right on par with President Obama’s initial policies, which were to target the “criminal
aliens” first, and under these policies, Obama deported over 400,000 in 2012).
271
Contra, cases cited supra note 141 (noting that courts have held that Criminal Procedure
Rule 5(a), or the right to a prompt probable cause hearing, does not apply to deportations).
272
Cf. James Q. Wilson, Bureaucracy, 180, 222, 225, 232, 289 (1989) (explaining that
bureaucracies resist changes to core tasks, will seek changes to core tasks only if it increases
agency autonomy, and will meet new problems when a policy is implemented unless new
resources are provided).
273
See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(A) (2012) (illustrating that there is always the possibility that
lawful permanent residents are deportable because they are inadmissible at the time of entry,
e.g., the noncitizen could have committed fraud in the application for their admission to the
United States); KANSTROOM, DEPORTATION NATION, supra note 11, at 5 (classifying as
extended border control deportation of those who have evaded border control by fraud or
misrepresentation). See also, e.g., In re Sosa, 20 I. & N. Dec. 758 (BIA 1993) (presenting in this
instance, their deportations would more easily be classified as extended border control
deportations.). In my fourteen years of experience representing lawful permanent residents
in removal proceedings and consulting with immigration detainees, many of whom are
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their visas and then are convicted of a crime can be charged either for
violating the terms of their visas or for the conviction. 274 Their
deportations are a hybrid—part post-entry social control; part extended
border control.275
This may lead to fewer deportations, particularly of lawful permanent
residents, who have the most to lose because they have been admitted to
the United States, some of them a long time ago, and often have other ties
to the community that go with long residence in the United States.276
While our immigration system still clings to the notion that they are
“simply being regulated,”277 not punished, and fails to provide them with
other protections like court-appointed counsel, at the very least requiring
the government to promptly prove the deportation of a lawful permanent
resident to a neutral judge provides some criminal procedure-type
protections in the immigration system. 278 The prompt probable cause
hearing is one step in the direction of providing stronger procedural
protections to LPRs, who, according to several scholars, are more
deserving of procedural protections that are available to defendants in the
criminal justice system.279
lawful permanent residents facing deportation, I have typically seen NTAs that charge the
criminal grounds of deportability.
274
See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(C) (2012) (authorizing removal of noncitizen for violating terms
of visa).
275
See KANSTROOM, DEPORTATION NATION, supra note 11, at 5 (classifying deportation
statutes for visa violations as contractual in nature because of the “contractual aspect of the
deal that permitted entry”). See also KANSTROOM, DEPORTATION NATION, supra note 11, at 6
and accompanying text (“[t]he purest post-entry social control laws . . . proscribe criminal or
political conduct within the United States, often without limit.”).
276
See Kevin R. Johnson, An Immigration Gideon for Lawful Permanent Residents, 122 YALE
L.J. 2394, 2404 (2013) (analyzing the importance of removal hearings for permanent residents
that are within the country legally); Markowitz, Straddling the Criminal-Civil Divide, supra
note 209, at 292 and accompanying text (“[p]ermanent residents, as a class, have the greatest
economic and familial connections and political allegiance to the United States”).
277
See Kanstroom, Deportation, Social Control, supra note 11, at 1895 and accompanying text
(suggesting that immigrants are not being punished but “simply being regulated”).
278
See generally U.S. CONST. amend. VI (displaying how the right to a fair, speedy trial is so
crucial that is has been added as an amendment to the U.S. Constitution).
279
See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 276, at 2405 (arguing for court-appointed counsel for LPRs
in deportation proceedings); Markowitz, Straddling the Criminal-Civil Divide, supra note 209,
at 292 (“[t]he well-founded recognition of permanent residents, and their precursor,
denizens, as ‘citizens’ of a lesser status holding rights superior to other noncitizens justifies
greater protection for this class of noncitizens”); David A. Martin, Due Process and Membership
in the National Community: Political Asylum and Beyond, 44 U. PITT. L. REV. 165, 214–15 (1983)
(showing that a noncitizen’s level of membership in the United States should govern how
much process is due to the noncitizen and therefore LPRs should receive the most procedural
protections). See also T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Aliens, Due Process and “Community Ties”: A
Response to Martin, 44 U. PITT. L. REV. 237, 244–45 (1983) (stating that Due Process should turn
not on the person’s membership in the United States community—the United States’
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What would truly make the probable cause hearing meaningful is if
the government had to explain its charging decision. 280 For example, there
are numerous Supreme Court and circuit court cases detailing why
several different types of offenses are not “crimes of violence,” 281 a federal
criminal law term of art that is incorporated in the aggravated felony
definition282 and the crime of domestic violence ground of deportability. 283
There are also numerous instances of the Supreme Court reversing the
Board of Immigration Appeals on the meaning of terms like “aggravated
felony” in deportation cases, calling upon the agency to use common sense
in interpreting this term of art.284 What if the immigration judge required
relationship to her—but rather on her community ties—what the United States is taking from
her); Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 119 (defining probable cause hearing).
280
See Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 119–20 (conveying the meaning of probable cause hearing and
its justifications).
281
See, e.g., Johnson v. United States., 559 U.S. 133, 138 (2010) (demonstrating Florida
common law battery, which punished actual and intentional touching, was not a violent
felony, which is defined as an offense that has as an element the use, attempted use, or
threatened use of physical force against the person of another, under a sentencing
enhancement statute that is virtually the same as the first prong of 18 U.S.C. § 16); Leocal v.
Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 11–12 (2004) (displaying that in Florida, aggravated DUI is not a crime
of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 16).
282
See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F) (2012) (showing that an aggravated felony can be a crime
of violence).
283
See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i) (2012) (categorizing the crimes of domestic violence,
stalking, and child abuse as violent crimes).
284
For example, the Supreme Court, in a unanimous decision in 2004, decided, evoking
common sense, that a DUI statute punishing negligently causing serious bodily injury was
not a crime of violence aggravated felony, overruling the Board and some circuit courts. See
Leocal, 543 U.S. at 10 (“[w]e cannot forget that we ultimately are determining the meaning of
the term ‘crime of violence.’ The ordinary meaning of this term, combined with § 16’s
emphasis on the use of physical force against another person (or the risk of having to use
such force in committing a crime), suggests a category of violent, active crimes that cannot
be said naturally to include DUI offenses.”). Similarly, in a series of decisions determining
the meaning of “drug trafficking aggravated felony,” the Court found that the Board failed
to use common sense. Id. See, e.g., Moncrieffe v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 1678, 1686–89 (2013)
(reasoning that a misdemeanor conviction under a statute that was broad enough to
encompass social sharing of small amounts of marijuana was not a drug trafficking
aggravated felony). See also id. at 1689 (quoting Lopez v. Gonzales, 549 U.S. 47, 54) (“[t]here
is a more fundamental flaw in the Government’s approach: It would render even an
undisputed misdemeanor an aggravated felony. This is ‘just what the English language tells
us not to expect,’ and that leaves us ‘very wary of the Government’s position.’”); CarachuriRosendo v. Holder, 560 U.S. 563, 581–82 (2010) (holding that a second simple possession
offense was not an aggravated felony within the meaning of 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(B) because
it was not punished as a recidivist offense in the state); id. at 575 (citing Lopez, 549 U.S. at 54)
(“[b]ecause the English language tells us that most aggravated felonies are punishable by
sentences far longer than ten days, and that mere possession of one tablet of Xanax does not
constitute ‘trafficking,’ Lopez instructs us to be doubly wary of the Government’s position in
this case”); Lopez v. Gonzales, 549 U.S. 47, 54 (2006) (“[r]eading [the statute] the
Government’s way, then, would often turn simple possession into trafficking, just what the
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the government to explain why existing Supreme Court and circuit court
cases could be distinguished from the statute at issue in the government’s
deportation case against the individual? This would lead to fewer
wrongful deportations for criminal conduct, as judges would more closely
monitor overzealous DHS attorneys.285 DHS would be forced to do their
research before detaining a lawful permanent resident, because they
would need to supply a prompt answer to a judge why the conviction fit
within the ground of deportability. 286 DHS thus could exercise its
discretion to only “prove up” the cases they are prioritizing. 287
Returning to Carlos’ case example,288 let us examine more closely why
he spent thirteen weeks in jail before the immigration judge confirmed
that he actually was deportable for the reasons charged by the government
(and thus his detention pursuant to such deportation was justified). Did
the lack of a lawyer cause this delay? Somewhat (perhaps a few weeks of
searching for a lawyer caused non-action on his case). Did the actual
hiring of a lawyer cause this delay? Perhaps; without a lawyer, the judge
and DHS would have reached the same result, that he was deportable,
without considering the large body of case law on why his crime was not
a “crime of violence” that would render him deportable.289 After thirteen
weeks of detention, the judge decided that the government had proved
removability by clear and convincing evidence. What if the judge only
English language tells us not to expect, and that result makes us very wary of the
Government’s position”).
285
See Johnson, 333 U.S. at 13–14 (discussing the Fourth Amendment’s requirement that
probable cause be decided by a neutral and detached magistrate, so that the inferences of
“zealous officers” may be checked by a “neutral and detached magistrate instead of being
judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime”).
See also Nina Rabin, Victims or Criminals? Discretion, Sorting, and Bureaucratic Culture in the
U.S. Immigration System, 23 S. CAL. REV. L & SOC. JUST. 195, 199 (2014) (outlining ICE’s agency
culture, which perceives any noncitizen with a criminal conviction as a threat, regardless of
the circumstances of that conviction, and arguing that the Obama-era agenda of
prosecutorial discretion largely failed because it inadequately accounted for ICE agency’s
culture); Kagan, supra note 6, at 163 (showing how Michael Kagan has noted that “[t]o see
the need for neutral review of immigration custody, one need not accuse DHS of willfully
seeking to wrongfully arrest people on immigration grounds. One need only imagine that
immigration officers are human and that they sometimes make mistakes.”).
286
Contra Kelly, Enforcement Memo, supra note 18, at 4 (outlining that the DHS officials
should act consistently with President Trump’s Executive Order and grants full authority to
initiate removal proceedings for aliens as described by any provision of the INA).
287
See Rabin, supra note 285, at 199 (demonstrating ICE’s agency culture, which perceives
any noncitizen with a criminal conviction as a threat, regardless of the circumstances of that
conviction, and arguing that the Obama-era agenda of prosecutorial discretion largely failed
because it inadequately accounted for ICE agency’s culture).
288
See supra Part II.B (analyzing warrantless arrests and procedures in the immigration
system).
289
See Flores v. Meese, 942 F.2d 1352, 1359 (1991) (describing crime of violence cases).
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had to decide whether there was probable cause to hold Carlos?290 What
if the judge was forced to make this decision earlier in the process—let us
say within seventy-two hours of his arrest? In the criminal justice process,
probable cause hearings must be completed within forty-eight hours of
arrest to justify continued pretrial detention.291 This timeline is not as
strict in other forms of civil detention, such as civil commitment; 292 yet a
timeline exists, and it is certainly significantly shorter than the average
amount of time before which Carlos had his case reviewed by a judge.
What would these hearings look like? First and foremost, the
government would need to present certified conviction records to show
probable cause that the noncitizen is deportable under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1227(a)(2);293 for political deportations, the government would likely
present affidavits or prior statements by the detainee. 294 Ideally, if a body
of case law exists where courts have found similar statutes to not fit within
the ground of deportability,295 the judge would force DHS to explain why
the result would be different in this case. 296 The probable cause hearing,
at which DHS would have to prove its decision, would happen every time
DHS listed a criminal or political ground of deportability on an NTA—not
only when the detainee requested such a hearing, or when the detainee
had the knowledge and ability to argue why his conviction might not fit

“Probable cause” is a lower standard of proof than “clear and convincing evidence.”
See California ex rel. Cooper v. Mitchell Bros.’ Santa Ana Theater, 454 U.S. 90, 93 n.6 (1981)
(defining “clear, unequivocal, and convincing” as “a higher probability than is required by
the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard”). See also, Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 111
(quoting Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964)) (defining “probable cause” as “facts and
circumstances ‘sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing that the (suspect) had
committed or was committing an offense’”); id. at 121 (reasoning that probable cause “does
not require the file resolution of conflicting evidence that a reasonable-doubt or even a
preponderance standard demands”).
291
See Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 113–14 (discussing the justification for arresting a person for a
brief period of detention).
292
See Kagan, supra note 6, at 166 (expressing that to deprive someone of liberty, it must
come within a set period of days).
293
See Removal Proceedings, 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(3)(B) (2006) (stating the official documents
needed for a conviction, such as the official judgement, verdict, and plea). See also Evidence
of Criminal Conviction, 8 C.F.R. § 1003.41 (2017) (specifying and naming the documents
needed for a criminal conviction).
294
To mirror probable cause hearings in the criminal justice system, such affidavits would
be admissible even though the witness is not available for cross-examination. See Gerstein
v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 121–22 (1975) (expressing that the Court authorized fewer procedural
rights in a probable cause hearing, e.g., one trial right that would not be available is the
confrontation right to cross-examine witnesses).
295
See Lasch, supra note 3, at 187 (discussing statutory language giving broad discretion to
officials).
296
See id. at 186 (addressing the authorization of immigration detainers and the steps
necessary for the issuance of detainers).
290
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within the ground of deportability. 297 Such a probable cause hearing can
be combined with what is now the deportability decision at a master
calendar hearing, so long as it happens within seventy-two hours.298
Should DHS need more time to meet the higher “clear and convincing
evidence” standard for deportability, however, these hearings can be
separate.299
In the criminal context, probable cause hearings happen without the
constitutional right to court-appointed counsel, as the probable cause
hearing is not deemed to be a “critical stage” of the proceedings that is
sufficiently important to the adversarial process to have the right to
counsel attach.300 I am not advocating that noncitizens obtain more
process at the probable cause hearing than they would obtain if they were
arrested for a crime.301 However, because the detainee is without counsel,
it is even more critical that the immigration judge require that the
government actually prove that the noncitizen is deportable, and thus
pretrial detention is justified.302 It is important that this probable cause
not merely be a rubber stamp on DHS’s decision. 303
If DHS cannot prove its case at the prompt probable cause hearing,
then the detainee goes free. Nothing prevents DHS from bringing a
deportation case against the noncitizen; the difference is that the
noncitizen need not wait in detention while the government takes its
sweet time building a case against him or her.304 Free from detention, that
297
See supra notes 178–81 (critiquing Joseph hearings). See also Kagan, supra note 6, at 162
(“[t]he central issues [in a Gerstein probable cause hearing] are neutrality, time, and
automacity.”).
298
See Cty. of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 59 (1991) (permitting the county to
combine probable cause hearings with arraignments, so long as the probable cause hearing
occurred within forty-eight hours).
299
See California ex rel. Cooper v. Mitchell Brothers’ Santa Ana Theater, 454 U.S. 90, 93
(1981) (providing that the “clear and convincing” standard is meant to protect important
interests in very few civil cases). This Article is not advocating for a right to counsel at this
stage.
300
See Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 160 (1985) (expressing that to leave a person without
counsel before trial might be more detrimental than during the actual trial itself and this
deprivation should not be allowed). See also Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 112 (1974) (stating
that to allow fewer compromises would mean to leave citizens at the mercy of the officers).
301
See generally Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 111 (describing the circumstances to warrant a probable
cause arrest).
302
See generally Kagan, supra note 6, 142–43 (questioning whether indefinite detention of
noncitizens that were found deportable was permitted by American immigration law).
303
See Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 112–13 (quoting Johnson, 333 U.S. at 13–14) (“[the Fourth
Amendment’s] protection consists in requiring that those inferences [which reasonable men
can draw from evidence] be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being
judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime.”).
304
See Morales v. Chadbourne, 793 F.3d 208, 218 (reasoning that ICE officials are welcome
to go about their work in determining whether there is reasonable suspicion that someone
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noncitizen has easier access to counsel, which in turn may help him or her
avoid wrongful deportation.305 Why does the right to a bond hearing
before an immigration judge not satisfy the same concerns? 306 After all, a
noncitizen may request that the immigration judge review DHS’s initial
decision to detain;307 this bond hearing can happen at or before the first
master calendar hearing.308 There are several reasons why the right to a
bond hearing does parallel a Gerstein-Riverside probable cause hearing.309
First, in reality, the bond hearing does not necessarily happen quickly,
since the detainee has only one opportunity to ask for such a bond
hearing310 and, because the detainee bears the burden of proof, 311 it is in
the detainee’s interest to get more time to adequately prepare the case. 312
Juan’s case example demonstrates the delays that often occur before

has violated the immigration laws; they just must let the person out of jail while they
undertake such investigation).
305
See Ingrid V. Eagly & Steven Shafer, Article: A National Study of Access to Counsel in
Immigration Court, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 3–4 (2015) (explaining that right to counsel on
immigration matters has always been a right, but not one that the government pays for).
Ingrid V. Eagly and Steven Shafer conducted a national study between 2007 and 2012
researching the scope and impact of attorney representation in immigration courts. Id. at 6.
They analyzed over 1.2 million immigration removal cases over six years for the study, and
concluded that detainees were five times less likely to obtain representation than
nondetained respondents, and without representation, were more likely to lose their cases
and be deported. Id. at 6. Thus, detention led to a greater likelihood of wrongful
deportations. Id. at 31.
306
See id. at 31 (providing that detainees who are eligible for release on bond remain in jail
because they are too poor to pay for the actual bond amount).
307
See Apprehension, Custody, and Detention, 8 C.F.R. § 236.1(c)(8) (2016) (addressing that
the alien must demonstrate to the officer that a release after being detained would not pose
a danger to society and the alien will appear for future proceedings). See also Custody/Bond,
8 C.F.R. § 1003.19 (2006) (providing that the bond amount is determined by review of an
immigration judge pursuant to 8 C.F.R part 1236).
308
The detainee has a right to request a bond hearing without waiting for a master calendar
hearing, but many pro se detainees may not realize this. See Jurisdiction and Commencement
of Proceedings, 8 C.F.R. § 1003.14(a) (explaining that proceedings before an immigration
judge begins when the charging document is filed, but a charging document is not required
to be filed for a bond proceeding). See also Wadhia, supra note 4, at 876 (describing that a
detained noncitizen can file a request for bond even though the NTA has not been filed in
immigration court).
309
See Custody/Bond, 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19(e) (expressing the order of a bond determination).
310
See id. (stating that in order for a bond redetermination to happen, there must be a
showing that the alien’s circumstances have changed materially).
311
See, e.g., In re Fatahi, 26 I. & N. Dec. 791, 795 (BIA 2016) (providing that the alien has the
burden to show and prove that he is not a danger to society and persons). See also In re
Guerra, 24 I. & N. Dec. 37, 40 (BIA 2006) (detailing that the alien has the burden to show that
he/she should be released on bond). In re Adenigi, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 1102, 1125 (1999) (stating
that the respondent bears the burden of proof).
312
See Deportable Aliens, 8 U.S.C. § 1227 (2008) (describing the timeline for typical bond
hearing).

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2018

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 52, No. 2 [2018], Art. 2

278

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 52

review of detention by an immigration judge.313 Second, in the bond
hearing, the detainee bears the burden of proving he is not a danger or a
flight risk;314 this is the opposite presumption of what exists at a probable
cause hearing—a presumption of freedom, with the government
justifying its decision to detain.315 Finally, if DHS argues that the detainee
fits within one of the many criminal grounds of deportability that trigger
mandatory detention,316 he does not even have the right to a bond hearing,
unless he can prove that DHS is substantially unlikely to prevail on the
mandatory detention charge.317 So all ICE has to do is write a NTA, and
the burden shifts to the detainee for all custody-related matters.318
Why does the Joseph hearing, which allows an immigration court to
review whether a detainee is properly included in a mandatory detention
category, not remedy the lack of a prompt probable cause hearing? 319 For
one, there are significant critiques of the standard in a Joseph hearing, as
detailed above.320 Also, hearings only occur when the ground of
removability is a mandatory detention ground. 321 For those like Carlos,
who are removable on a non-mandatory detention ground, his only
method of making the government prove its case is by filing a motion to
terminate and litigating the issue of whether his crime actually makes him
deportable. But, as demonstrated above, this could take weeks. 322

313
See generally Apprehension, Custody, and Detention, 8 C.F.R § 236.1 (defining the
issuance of the notice to appear and when the respondent may be arrested and taken into
custody).
314
See Holper, supra note 90, at 81-94 (discussing the burden of the detainee).
315
See McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 343–44 (citing to a congressional statute
requiring prompt probable cause hearings and stating: “[l]egislation such as this, requiring
that the police must with reasonable promptness show legal cause for detaining arrested
persons, constitutes an important safeguard.”).
316
See Apprehension and Detention of Aliens, 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) (indicating that the Board
has held that it is not necessary for DHS to charge the mandatory detention ground on the
NTA to raise it as a bar to a bond hearing). See also In re Kotliar, 24 I. & N. Dec. 124, 126–27
(BIA 2007) (determining if this offense would give rise to a charge of removability).
317
See In re Joseph, 22 I. & N. Dec. 799, 800 (describing the judge’s bond ruling if the alien
is “properly included” in a mandatory is subject to the automatic stay).
318
See id. (describing that a permanent resident might not be properly included in a
mandatory detention if before or after the prior removal case).
319
See id. (explaining that this determination is made by 8 C.F.R. § 3.19).
320
See Chacón, supra note 2 (expressing the gaps of rights and remedies of noncitizens in
removal proceedings and how this encourages strict forms of policing in immigrant areas).
321
See In re Joseph, 22 I. & N. Dec. 799, 804 (BIA 1999) (showing that the only authority is
confined to whether the Service had a good cause for charging respondent with removability
under one of the sections of the Act).
322
See id. at 807 (stating that the immigration judge has discretion on the custody status
bond and the judge can use any information that is available to make this determination).
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B. Addressing Concerns with the Bifurcation of Rights
In proposing different rights for different types of removal
proceedings, I am following the lead of other scholars who have paved
this road.323 In 2008, Peter Markowitz proposed that there should be a
bifurcation of these different removal proceedings. 324
Markowitz
proposed that expulsion of LPRs for crime should be a criminal
proceeding, where all of the protections of a criminal trial attach.325 For
all other types of removal proceedings, they should be deemed civil, with
the corresponding lack of procedural protections. 326 He draws the line at
admission as a lawful permanent resident and writes that “[t]he wellfounded recognition of permanent residents, and their precursor,
denizens, as ‘citizens’ of a lesser status holding rights superior to other
noncitizens justifies greater protection for this class of noncitizens.” 327
Drawing on similar protections for lawful permanent residents, Kevin
Johnson has made the case for the right to court-appointed counsel in
removal proceedings only for lawful permanent residents. 328
Through this proposal, I am in no way suggesting that those who
entered illegally, who are deportable for being present in the United
States, or others whose cases are more clearly in the extended border
control realm, do not have Fourth Amendment rights. 329 Indeed, this

See Markowitz, supra note 209, at 290 (establishing that noncitizens who are the subject
of removal and traditional proceedings have a lack of procedural protections).
324
See id. (illustrating that this contribution explains a distinction between “exclusion
proceedings” and “expulsion proceedings”).
325
See id. at 290–91 (reasoning that the bifurcated approach excludes noncitizens from
entering into civil proceedings).
326
See id. (reviewing that the Supreme Court test that determines civil or criminal nature
of how proceedings should go provides clear guidance on dividing the line).
327
See id. at 292. Markowitz justifies this distinction by reasoning that the issues in an
exclusion case—defense from outside aggression and self-determination—justify the greater
power of the government in the exclusion realm. Id. at 293. Expulsion is a tool used to protect
against danger within our society, and the central purpose of such protection is to
incapacitate residents who pose a threat or danger. Id.
328
See Johnson, supra note 276, at 2402 (expressing that a person does have a privilege of
being represented by counsel to removal proceedings, but a noncitizen does not have this
guaranteed by the government during removal proceedings). See also Mark Noferi, Making
Civil Immigration Detention “Civil,” and Examining the Emerging U.S. Civil Detention Paradigm,
27 J. DOV. RTS. & ECON. DEV. 533, 536–37 (arguing that only lawful permanent residents
should have the right to court-appointed counsel in Joseph hearings).
329
See Au Yi Lau v. USINS, 445 F.2d 217, 223 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (“[s]ince aliens in this country
are sheltered by the Fourth Amendment in common with citizens, such a reading of the
Congressional mandate [the immigration statute authorizing warrantless arrests] must be
controlled by the constitutional standards governing similar detentions made by other law
enforcement officials.”).
323
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would be counter to Supreme Court case law.330 In the 1970s, the Supreme
Court in Almeida-Sanchez v. United States331 and United States v. BrignoniPonce332 applied the Fourth Amendment to border agents’ interactions
with noncitizens.333 More recently in 2012, the Supreme Court in Arizona
v. United States reiterated that the Fourth Amendment applies to
immigration arrests.334 That the Fourth Amendment applies when an ICE
officer arrests a noncitizen for deportation is one of the few positive
outcomes of the 1984 Lopez-Mendoza decision, where the Court refused to
apply the exclusionary rule, except when immigration officers committed
egregious violations of the noncitizen’s Fourth Amendment rights. 335
Because the Lopez-Mendoza decision, which has been heavily critiqued by
scholars,336 dealt only with the remedy of evidentiary exclusion, it
implicitly recognized that the Fourth Amendment applies to such an
arrest,337 as subsequent courts have clarified.338 Similarly, the Court’s
330
See Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973) (establishing that the search
of petitioner’s car is deemed warrantless and made without probable cause, violating the
Fourth Amendment).
331
See id. (explaining that the search of the automobile could not be justified as probable
cause due to officers lacking warrant or reason).
332
See 422 U.S. 873 (1975) (describing how the Fourth Amendment does not allow a stop
and question of a vehicle’s occupants regarding immigration status).
333
See id. at 878 (explaining that the Fourth Amendment applies to all seizures of the
person, including short arrests); Almeida, 413 U.S. at 272–73 (providing that searches may
take place at other places other than the border itself).
334
See 567 U.S. 387, 414 (2012) (determining that the person’s immigration status is to be
determined before he/she is released).
335
See INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1050–51 (holding that immigration officers
can exclude evidence of peaceful arrests of noncitizens).
336
See Chacón, supra note 2, at 1624 (proposing the application of the Fourth Amendment
exclusionary rule in removal proceedings). See also Burch Elias, supra note 2, at 1115 (arguing
for an application of the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule due to widespread
constitutional violations by immigration officers and a fundamental change in immigration
court practice since Lopez-Mendoza was decided); David Gray et al., The Supreme Court’s
Contemporary Silver Platter Doctrine, 91 TEX. L. REV. 7, 25 (2012) (criticizing Lopez-Mendoza
Court’s reasoning that law enforcement officers are primarily interested in criminal law
enforcement, not immigration enforcement, and that imposing the exclusionary rule in
immigration proceedings therefore offers little or no additional deterrence benefit beyond
that provided by the threat of suppression in criminal trials as “of course. . ., another iteration
of the spectacular non sequitur”).
337
See M. Isabel Medina, Ruminations on the Fourth Amendment: Case Law, Commentary, and
the Word “Citizen,” 11 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 189, 196 (2008) (finding that this exclusionary
rule does not apply in deportation proceedings, but evidence could be admitted in a
deportation proceeding to prove the deportability of an undocumented noncitizen). See also
id. (“[t]he Lopez-Mendoza opinion accepted without question the principle that the Fourth
Amendment applied to undocumented persons in a criminal proceeding”).
338
See, e.g., Yanez-Marquez v. Lynch, 789 F.3d 434, 450 (4th Cir. 2015) (describing that the
exclusionary rule applies where the evidence has been obtained by violation of the Fourth
Amendment); Oliva-Ramos v. USAG, 694 F.3d 259, 271–72 (3d Cir. 2012) (discussing that the

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol52/iss2/2

Holper: Promptly Proving the Need to Detain for Post-Entry Social Control

2018]

Social Control Deportation

281

opinion in INS v. Delgado339 also started with the assumption that the
Fourth Amendment applied when immigration agents engaged in a
factory raid, where they interrogated noncitizens about their right to be in
the United States.340
Nor does the Court’s 1990 decision in United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez
foreclose the argument that noncitizens who entered illegally have no
claims to Fourth Amendment rights. 341 In Verdugo-Urquidez, the Court
held that a Mexican citizen could not claim suppression as a remedy for a
Fourth Amendment violation when U.S. federal agents searched his home
in Mexico after they had arrested him in Mexico and extradited him to the
United States for prosecution. 342 The Court examined the history of the
Fourth Amendment’s reference to “the people” and found that unlike
other amendments (such as the Fifth Amendment that applies to
“persons” and the Sixth Amendment that applies to the “accused”), the
Fourth Amendment only applies to citizens of the United States or those
with voluntary substantial connections to the political community of the
United States343 Because he had not established “voluntary substantial
connections” to the United States, Mr. Verdugo-Urquidez could not claim
Fourth Amendment rights.344 While the Court stated that the LopezMendoza Court had not expressly decided that the Fourth Amendment
applied to “illegal aliens in this country,” 345 the Court did suggest that the
Fourth Amendment should apply to noncitizens who are illegally in the
United States because “the illegal aliens in Lopez-Mendoza were in the
United States voluntarily and presumably had accepted some societal
obligations,” which distinguished their cases from that of Mr. Verdugo-

exclusionary rule should apply in deportation proceedings involving Fourth Amendment
violations); Kandamar v. Gonzales, 464 F.3d 65, 70–71 (1st Cir. 2006) (explaining that the
exclusionary rule should not apply because this is a case in violation of the Fourth
Amendment); Almeida-Amaral v. Gonzales, 461 F.3d 231, 235 (2d Cir. 2006) (holding that
stopping aliens without reasonable suspicion infringed on Fourth Amendment rights).
339
See 466 U.S. 210, 232 (1984) (discussing that workers were questioned on if they were
deportable aliens and were subject to questioning by INS agents).
340
See id. at 218–19 (explaining that the workers’ freedom of movement was restricted due
to the workers obligations to their employer). In this case, the Court found that the workers
were free to leave, despite the INS agents standing at each doorway; therefore, no unlawful
seizure had occurred that would require the INS to prove probable cause. Id.
341
See 494 U.S. 259, 274–75 (1990) (explaining that the facts in Verduga-Urquidez’s case do
not call for a comprehensive Fourth Amendment analysis).
342
See id. at 262–62, 274–75 (outlining the facts from Verduga-Urquidez).
343
See id. at 264–66 (highlighting the court’s reasoning in Verduga-Urquidez).
344
Id. at 271.
345
Id. at 272.
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Urquidez, who “had no voluntary connections with this country that
might place him among ‘the people’ of the United States.” 346
While I presume that Fourth Amendment rights exist for all
noncitizens in the United States,347 in this Article, my proposal deals more
narrowly with the remedy for violations of the Fourth Amendment right to
have one’s detention promptly reviewed by a neutral judge.348 Other
remedies would still be available for violations of noncitizens’ Fourth
Amendment rights.349 For example, when the Fourth Amendment
violation is egregious, the exclusionary rule will apply in removal
proceedings.350 Also, noncitizens may complain about officer conduct
during an arrest through DHS’s own regulations.351 These regulations
deal exclusively with the conduct of an officer when arresting a
noncitizen, instead of the length of time before which a noncitizen should
be brought before a neutral judge.352 I do not suggest that these remedies
are adequate; rather, I leave the critique of these remedies to others,

346
Id. at 272–73 (stating the plurality view that the Fourth Amendment generally does not
apply to illegal aliens). Courts have disagreed about whether the plurality opinion’s
discussion with respect to whether the Fourth Amendment applies to illegal aliens is dicta
or binding precedent. See, e.g., Martinez-Aguero v. Gonzalez, No. EP-03-CA-411(KC), 2005
WL 388589, at *5 (W.D. Tex. Feb. 2, 2005), aff’d and remanded, 459 F.3d 618 (5th Cir. 2006)
(finding that a border cross-card holder had Fourth Amendment rights and stating that
“[t]he definition of ‘the people’ advanced in Verdugo-Urquidez is therefore considered as
persuasive authority to the extent it applies to resolution of the present motion for summary
judgment.”). See also United States v. Guitterez, 983 F.Supp. 905, 915 (N.D. Cal. 1998) (“[i]t
is also noteworthy that a majority of the justices did not subscribe to Chief Justice Rehnquist’s
[Verdugo-Urquidez] opinion, particularly with respect to his discussion and analysis
regarding the scope of the Fourth Amendment as it applies to illegal aliens” (emphasis in
original)); United States v. Esparza-Mendoza, 265 F.Supp.2d 1254, 1261 (D.Utah 2003) (“[t]his
court is not at liberty to second-guess Justice Kennedy’s direct statement that he was joining
the Court’s opinion.”).
347
See ADMINISTRATIVE AND EXPEDITED REMOVAL: IMMIGRATION LAW’S NEXT FOURTH
AMENDMENT PROBLEM (work in progress) (on file with author) (making this argument in
much more detail in another Article which is on file with the author).
348
See supra notes 52–65 and accompanying text (discussing the need for remedies against
violations of Fourth Amendment protections).
349
See Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1050–51 (exemplifying an available remedy).
350
See id. (explaining the Court’s interpretation of “egregious”). See also Elizabeth A. Rossi,
Revisiting INS v. Lopez-Mendoza: Why the Fourth Amendment Exclusionary Rule Should Apply
in Deportation Proceedings, 44 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 477, 480–81 (2013) (articulating an
application Lopez-Mendoza exceptions based on egregiousness); Yanez-Marquez, 789 F.3d at
459–60 (surveying the application of Lopez-Mendoza exceptions based on egregiousness).
351
See 8 C.F.R. § 287.10(a) (stating procedures for reviewing violations by immigration
officers). See also 8 C.F.R. § 287.8 (outlining standards for immigration officers pertaining to
enforcement activities).
352
See 8 C.F.R. § 287.10 (giving the process for noncitizen complaints). See generally 8 C.F.R.
§ 287.8(c)(2)(vi) (noting that the regulations only discuss prompt review by a magistrate
judge when a person is arrested and charged with a criminal violation).
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particularly those who have called upon the Supreme Court to revisit its
decision in Lopez-Mendoza.353
1.

Proposed Solution: Use of Immigration Judges for Post-Entry Social
Control Probable Cause Hearings

My proposal is that immigration judges should preside over probable
cause hearings for any admitted noncitizen who is charged as deportable
for a criminal conviction under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2); these hearings must
occur within seventy-two hours of arrest.354 One critique of this proposal
is the use of immigration judges to perform the “neutral magistrate”
function.355 Even an immigration judge, Judge Dana Marks, has stated
that to an outsider, it might appear that an institutional bias is embedded
within immigration judges’ decisions when they work within an
enforcement agency, the Department of Justice.356 This is made worse
when there are allegations of politics playing into the hiring of
immigration judges, as happened during the George W. Bush
administration.357
The history of why immigration judges exist within their current
subagency, the Executive Office for Immigration Review, contributes to
this conversation.358 Before the Supreme Court’s 1950 decision in Wong
Yang Sung v. McGrath,359 there were “presiding inspectors,” who presided
over deportation hearings, in the way an immigration judge would
See, e.g., Burch Elias, supra note 2, at 1112–14 (critiquing the remedies for the problems
in the current adjudication process). See also Rossi, supra note 350, at 530 (exploring possible
remedies for the problems in the current adjudication process); The Role of the Exclusionary
Rule in Removal Hearings, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1633, 1635 (2013) (explaining the role of the
exclusionary rule in deportation proceedings).
354
See supra notes 41–51 and accompanying text (discussing the current process of
immigration hearings).
355
See supra notes 41–51 and accompanying text (referencing the author’s proposal).
356
See Dana Leigh Marks, Who, Me? Am I Guilty of Implicit Bias?, 54 AM. BAR ASS’N JJ. J. 20,
21–22 (2015) (“[t]he immigration court system is housed in a law enforcement agency, the
United States Department of Justice, which is closely aligned with those who are the
prosecutors in our courts (Department of Homeland Security (DHS) trial counsel). This
structural arrangement has caused many members of the public we serve, and the attorneys
who represent them, to doubt our decisional independence.”).
357
See An Investigation of Allegations of Politicized Hiring by Monica Goodling and other Staff in
the Office of the Attorney General, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, (July 28, 2008), 69,
http://www.justice.gov/oig/special/s0807/final.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5E9A-72YS]
(finding that members of the Bush administration violated civil service laws and
departmental policy in selecting candidates for immigration judge positions based on
political ties and recommendations rather than professional qualifications).
358
See Yang Sung v. United States, 339 U.S. 33, 35 (1950) (presenting the question addressed
by the Court).
359
See id. (noting the historical role of presiding inspectors).
353
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today.360 Except that these presiding inspectors worked for the INS; the
only separation was that the presiding inspector was not permitted to hear
a case in which he had been the investigating officer unless the noncitizen
consented.361 The Supreme Court decided in Wong Yang Sung that the
Administrative Procedures Act (APA)’s requirement of separating judges
from prosecutors applied to deportation proceedings; this decision was a
watershed moment that completely upended the INS. 362 When Congress,
in 1950, decided that deportation proceedings would not be subject to the
APA because that would be too costly and too cumbersome, the culture
within the INS had shifted.363 Even though the Supreme Court later
confirmed that the APA’s hearing requirements did not apply to
deportation proceedings, 364 it was too late; the functions already had
separated.365 The INS created special inquiry officers to conduct hearings
and make decisions, and in 1956, there came about radical changes to the
INS’s hearing structure.366 Finally, in 1983, the EOIR was created, thus
finally divorcing the former INS from the immigration judges.367
If immigration judges are once-upon-a-time enforcement agents, then
why should the probable cause hearing be assigned to an immigration
judge instead of keeping the decision with a separate ICE officer? 368 For
one, a regulation binds immigration judges to make unbiased decisions; 369

360
See generally Rawitz, supra note 148, at 686–87 (chronicling the history of the separation
of functions between the INS and what ultimately became IJs under the newly-created EOIR
in 1983).
361
See generally id. at 687 (discussing the role of presiding inspector).
362
See generally id. at 688–89 (noting implications of the Court’s holding that the APA
required separating judges from prosecutorial roles).
363
See generally id. (explaining the evolution of INS procedures).
364
See Marcello v. Bonds, 349 U.S. 302, 310 (1955) (clarifying that the APA does not apply
to deportation hearings).
365
See id. at 306–11 (elaborating on the changes of law, including the changes made in
1952).
366
See Rawitz, supra note 148, at 690 (showing that these radical changes included: (1)
special inquiry officers were removed from the operational supervision by INS District
Directors, and placed under a Chief Special Inquiry Officer; (2) the Order to Show Cause
replaced the warrant for arrest and pleadings were introduced; (3) the examining and
prosecuting officer functions were mandatory in every case in which deportability was
contested; and (4) there was a creation of a “record file” for the special inquiry officers to use,
which insulated him from prejudicial material that might be contained in the noncitizen’s
general file).
367
See Rawitz, supra note 148, at 691.
368
See generally id. (noting the separation of functions between the INS and what ultimately
became IJs under the EOIR after 1983).
369
See 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.1(d)(2), 1003.10(b).
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but ICE has no such regulation.370 Also, Janet Gilboy’s discussion of the
“values dissensus . . . at the heart of the current interinstitutional
differences” in her empirical study of immigration judge bond hearings in
Chicago in the 1980s also helps to answer this question. 371 In this study,
she saw that immigration judges reduced bonds set by an INS officer in
two-thirds of the cases.372 Gilboy writes how INS focuses on immigration
enforcement, with bail as an important tool; immigration judges can strike
a different balance between effective immigration law enforcement and
protection of liberty interests.373 Other scholars have continued this
conversation, commenting on the institutional biases that cause ICE to
seek detention in more cases.374
In the current administration, former DHS Secretary John Kelly (now
White House Chief of Staff) has written memos interpreting President
Trump’s Executive Orders that prioritize detaining and deporting as
many eligible noncitizens as possible.375 Former press secretary Sean
Spicer has stated that such memos have taken the “shackles off” of ICE
officers, allowing them to deport and detain as many people as possible
and increasing their numbers.376 ICE Acting Director Thomas Homan
370
Cf. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 117 (quoting Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 402 U.S.
443, 449 (1971) (“[a] prosecutor’s responsibility to law enforcement is inconsistent with the
constitutional rule of a neutral and detached magistrate”).
371
Janet Gilboy, Administrative Review in a System of Conflicting Values, 13 L. & SOC. INQUIRY
515, 523–25 (1988).
372
See id. (discussing the role played by various levels of adjudicatory officers).
373
See id. at 523–25 (noting the differing values of adjudicatory officers, and how those
values impact the adjudication process).
374
See, e.g., Michele Pistone, Justice Delayed Is Justice Denied: A Proposal for Ending
Unnecessary Detention of Asylum Seekers, 12 HARV. HUM. RTS. L.J. 197, 239 (1999) (discussing
“bureaucratic biases” favoring detention over release of asylum seekers); Rabin, supra note
285, at 199 (explaining ICE’s agency culture, which perceives any noncitizen with a criminal
conviction as a threat, regardless of the circumstances of that conviction, and arguing that
the Obama-era agenda of prosecutorial discretion largely failed because it inadequately
accounted for ICE agency’s culture).
375
See EXECUTIVE ORDER: ENHANCING PUBLIC SAFETY IN THE INTERIOR OF THE UNITED
STATES (Jan. 25, 2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/01/25/
presidential-executive-order-enhancing-public-safety-interior-united [https://perma.cc/
X2FN-UP42] (showing Trump’s stance on immigration enforcement). See also EXECUTIVE
ORDER: BORDER SECURITY AND IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT IMPROVEMENTS (Jan. 25, 2017),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/01/25/executive-order-bordersecurity-and-immigration-enforcement-improvements
[https://perma.cc/V44P-9XEJ]
(highlighting Trump administration’s policy approach); Kelly, Border Security Implementation
Memo, supra note 18 (describing Trump’s executive approach to this area of immigration law
on President Trump’s administration); Kelly, Enforcement Memo, supra note 18 (noting the
current executive branch approach to this area of immigration law on President Trump’s
administration).
376
See Press Briefing by Press Secretary Sean Spicer, THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE OF PRESS
SECRETARY 13 (Feb. 21, 2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/02/21/
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stated to the House Appropriation Committee’s Homeland Security
Subcommittee, “[i]f you’re in this country illegally and committed a crime
by entering this country, you should be uncomfortable. . . [y]ou should
look over your shoulder, and you need to be worried.” 377 Given ICE’s
preexisting culture that favors detention and deportation, an institutional
ethos that has only grown during the Trump administration, one can see
the value of having an immigration judge, not an ICE officer, decide
probable cause.378
There are also practical considerations with immigration judges
taking on this new role. Immigration judges already have crushing
caseloads,379 especially for detention cases, which by directive by the Chief
Immigration Judge must be completed within sixty days. 380 To add these
cases into the mix would clearly burden the judges. 381 This conclusion,
however, assumes that EOIR cannot hire more judges, or that the money
to do so is not available.382 In recent years, when Congress funded the
Department of Homeland Security each year, there has been a “bed
mandate” that required funding to detain 34,000 immigration detainees
each year.383 Many assume this money is necessary for the country’s
safety without questioning this expense. If we authorize funding for
34,000 immigration detainees, then we should also authorize funding for
immigration judges to rule on the legality of detaining 34,000 people
(although my proposal only speaks to the post-entry social control
press-briefing-press-secretary-sean-spicer-2212017-13
[https://perma.cc/SR44-KP2Z]
(explaining the Trump administration’s stance on immigration laws).
377
Elise Foley, ICE Director to All Undocumented Immigrants: “You Need to Be Worried”,
HUFFINGTON POST (June 13, 2017), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/ice-arrestsundocumented_us_594027c0e4b0e84514eebfbe?utm_source=AILA+Mailing&utm_campaig
n=62b03d74b3-AILA8_6_15_17&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_3c0e619096-62b03d74b
3-290828949 [https://perma.cc/3XSA-D3W4].
378
See Rabin, supra note 285, at 199 and accompanying text (2014) (discussing ICE’s agency
culture).
379
See Madison Park, By the Numbers: Why Immigration Cases Take So Long, CNN (Apr. 12,
2017),
http://www.cnn.com/2017/04/12/politics/immigration-case-backlog-by-thenumbers/index.html. [https://perma.cc/C59L-HPQN] (“542,411, this is the number of
pending cases in immigration court as of February. The country’s 58 immigration courts are
already dealing with a crush of more than a half a million backlogged cases . . . ”).
380
See generally id. (commenting on immigration judges’ caseloads).
381
See id. (showing a large backlog of cases).
382
See id. (inferring that judges are not available for this task).
383
See, e.g., Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act of 2015, Pub. L. No.
114–4, March 4, 2015, 129 Stat. 39 (2015) (providing a bed mandate for funding. See also César
Cuauhtémoc García Hernández, Naturalizing Immigration Imprisonment, 103 CAL. L. REV.
1449, 1453, 1505 (2015) (commenting of the statutory bed mandate for funding). Only this
year did Congress take the mandate out, mandating instead that the Government
Accountability Office review ICE’s current methods for determining detention resource
requirements. Id.
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detainees, so other immigration detainees would not need additional
judges for probable cause hearings).
There is also the critique that immigration judges should not be
“policing the police.”384 Jennifer Chacón has argued that immigration
courts were not designed to police the police in the same manner as state
court judges, who traditionally monitor the enforcement conduct of police
officers.385 Also, she writes that immigration judges are not only
overburdened, but their decisions on Fourth Amendment rights violations
are heavily constrained by a body of law that formed at a time when
immigration enforcement looked very different than it does today. 386
Requiring judges to hold prompt probable cause hearings in post-entry
social control cases, however, does not require judges to rule on Fourth
Amendment issues that would arise when a noncitizen seeks the remedy
of suppression.387 Rather, the judge looks at whether the law and
conviction records support a finding of probable cause for the detainee to
be held pursuant to the violation of the Immigration and Nationality
Act—i.e., whether that crime is a “crime involving moral turpitude,”
“crime of domestic violence,” or other category of crime that makes him
deportable.388 This is not the type of “policing the police” that examines
the actions of ICE officers when they arrest a detainee. 389 Indeed, it is the
sort of decisions immigration judges make on a regular basis, whenever a
noncitizen who is deportable for a crime asks the immigration judge to
hold DHS to its burden of proof. 390 The proposal in this Article merely
requires that they make these decisions more quickly, and in every single
case where DHS charges deportability for a crime. 391
VI. CONCLUSION
The time has come for courts to take noncitizens’ Fourth Amendment
rights seriously. It is not enough that ICE—the police and prosecutor—
See Chacón, supra note 2, at 1568–69 (arguing that police acts are not generally meant to
be policed by immigration courts).
385
See id. at 1568 (“[u]nfortunately, unlike state and federal courts, which have long
overseen police activity, immigration courts were not designed to police the police.”).
386
See id. at 1569 (displaying the evolving deficiency in this area of immigration law).
387
See id. (discussing the way courts are administratively designed).
388
See generally 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2) (defining various deportable offenses).
389
See Chacón, supra note 2, 1566–67 (criticizing the immigration system for lacking a
system that puts a check on deportation detention).
390
See generally 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(3) (explaining that in the case of a noncitizen who has
been admitted, the government must prove deportability by clear and convincing evidence).
391
See, e.g., Amanda Frost, Learning from Our Mistakes: Using Immigration Enforcement
Errors to Guide Reform, 92 DENV. U. L. REV. 769, 774–75 (2015) (describing cases of Pedro
Guzman and Wilfredo Garza, both of whom were U.S. citizens that ICE erroneously believed
to be illegally in the United States and deported).
384
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decide as quickly as they can whether a noncitizen is deportable for postentry conduct such as a criminal conviction. The promise of the Fourth
Amendment, as interpreted by the Supreme Court in Gerstein and
Riverside, tells us that review of a warrantless arrest must happen
promptly by a neutral judge. The injustices of immigration law’s lack of
such a prompt review of detention is highlighted when one sees that many
LPRs suffer time away from their families, employment, and property ties,
all because an ICE officer believed him or her to be deportable for a postentry act. ICE officers can and have been proven to be wrong in their
determinations of who was deportable and thus subject to immigration
detention.392 The numerous detentions for deportation that already have
occurred—with many more likely to occur—highlight the need for
automatic, prompt review by a judge of ICE’s detention decisions, at least
in the context of post-entry social control deportations.

392
See id. (providing the consequences of poor law enforcement and adjudication
procedures).
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